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Labor market regulation involves many aspects, ranging from how employers contract for the
services  of  workers  to  the  nature  of  the  exchange,  including  terms  of  conditions  of
employment.  This  area of regulation represents  an important  and often controversial  aspect
of public policy in both  developed  and developing countries.  Approaches  are dominated  by
opposing  views,  one  which  favors  the protection  of workers  through  labor legislation  and
collective  bargaining  and the other which  emphasizes the advantages  of encouraging market
processes.  In  the  end,  however,  what  matters  are  the  economic  and  social  outcomes  of
different approaches.  This primer paper reviews different regulatory  options regarding hiring
and firing and wage determination  and summarizes the existing knowledge about their labor
market effects. It also reviews two important institutional aspects of labor market regulation -
- enforcement  and dispute resolution.  In an annex to the paper,  we summarize the statutory
arrangements for various topics related to labor market regulation in 17 countries.Labor Market Regulation:
International Experience  in Promoting Employment and Social Protection
Gordon Betcherman, Amy Luinstra, and Makoto  Ogawa*
1. INTRODUCTION
In  its simplest  form,  the  labor market  - like  all  markets  - is  a repeated  series  of
exchanges:  in this  case  between  capital  and  labor.  For well-known  reasons,  though,  labor
markets - again  like all markets  - function  in a much more  complicated  fashion.  They  are
affected  by  a host of cultural,  institutional,  legal,  and  political mechanisms.  Together these
mechanisms constitute what  we mean by "labor market regulation."  There are many aspects
involved, ranging from how employers  contract for the services of labor to the nature of the
exchange - including the rights and responsibilities of the parties, the terms and conditions of
work, and the resolution of disputes.  Given the direct impacts that labor markets have on the
welfare of workers and their families, this area of regulation represents an important, visible,
and often controversial aspect of public policy.
There are various reasons why societies may choose to intervene in the regulation of
labor  markets.  These  generally  fall  under  two  categories:  market  failures  and
injustice/exploitation.  Thus,  intervention  may  be motivated  by either  efficiency  or equity
reasons, or both.
Societies  tend to respond  to these concerns  both informally  and  formally.  Informal
mechanisms  often take the form of longstanding  cultural practices - for example, traditional
values of respect  and justice that control  exploitative  behavior.  However, the  effectiveness
of informal  mechanisms  is  limited.  As  societies  develop  economically  and  social  and
community  links  often  weaken,  labor  market  regulation  inevitably  becomes  more  formal.
The two  most prevalent  formal  modes  are  collective  voice  (through  representation  of the
parties  and  voluntary  collective  bargaining)  and  direct  government  intervention  through
statutory  regulation  (e.g.,  labor  laws,  decrees,  etc.).  In  all  societies,  these  two  modes  of
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World Bank. The authors welcome further comments.regulation will co-exist with market  and informal mechanisms.  But different societies clearly
exhibit different  mixes --  for example,  many observers  have  contrasted the market-oriented
American  approach  with  greater  emphasis  on  statutory  and  collective  voice  regulation  in
many European countries. Regardless of the particular mix, however, public policy underpins
the choice and provides the legitimacy for ongoing practices.  This is most obvious in the case
of statutory  regulation.  However,  even  where  the "rules  of the  game"  are  determined  by
collective  bargaining or market processes, public policy establishes the enabling framework.
Approaches to labor market regulation are dominated by  two opposing perspectives -
vAhat  Freeman  (1993)  has  called  the  "institutionalist"  and  "distortionist"  views.  The
"institutionalist"  view  sees  job  security  arrangements,  minimum  wages,  and  collective
bargaining  as  providing  important  social  protection  for  workers,  as  instruments  for
encouraging  productivity  growth  (through  training  and  the  accumulation  of firm-specific
skills),  and  as means  of moderating  the  effects  of downswings  in  aggregate  demand.  The
"distortionist"  perspective  emphasizes  the  advantage  of market processes  and is  concerned
that  these  institutional  forms  of  regulation  impede  adjustments  to  economic  shocks,
discourage  hiring, and favor "insiders"  (i.e., regular workers).
In  the  end,  however,  what  is  critical  are  the  economic  and  social  outcomes  of
different  approaches  to regulation.  How the labor market is regulated  (in reality rather than
simply "on paper") can affect the rate of  job creation and destruction;  levels of employment
and unemployment;  productivity,  wages, and profits; and the degree of social protection and
justice  afforded  workers.  The  key issue for policy-makers,  then,  is to try to understand  the
likely  outcomes of different  regulatory  approaches.  This  is a difficult challenge  which does
not  easily  lend  itself to  conclusive  empirical  analysis.  Nonetheless,  different  modes  of
regulation do have  strengths and  weaknesses  and some conclusions  can be drawn about the
impacts of various approaches.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a "primer"  on labor market regulation. In the
next  section,  we  briefly  review  the  different  modes  of regulation  and  summarize  their
strengths  and  risks.  In  section  3,  we  turn  to  the  empirical  evidence  on  the  labor  market
impacts  of different  regulatory  options  regarding  hiring  and  contracting,  dismissals,  and
wage  determination.  In section  4,  we  review  two  important  institutional  aspects  of labor
market regulation - enforcement  and dispute resolution. Section 5 offers a brief conclusion.
2In an annex to this paper,  we summarize the statutory arrangements  for a selection of
countries  on the  following topics:  scope of labor law  application;  regulation  of fixed  term
contracts,  private  employment  services,  job  leasing/temporary  workers;  advance  notice,
justification,  and  severance  payment  requirements  for individual  and  collective  dismissal;
rules governing  establishment  of trade  unions, restrictions  on industrial  disputes  and unfair
labor practices; and provisions for minimum wages.
2. MODES OF LABOR MARKET REGULATION
Countries  can adopt a range  of approaches  to regulate the functioning of their  labor
market.  Mechanisms  can be market-based,  statutory,  or  based  on  collective  voice.  All  co-
exist, to varying degrees,  in every society.'
Where  there  is a  reliance  on  market-based  mechanisms,  labor  markets  are  often
characterized  as "unregulated."  However,  Standing (1999)  argues that this should be viewed
instead as one approach to regulating employment relations. And, indeed, it is a policy choice
to use legislation  and other regulatory  instruments to this end. At the heart of market-based
regulation  is  the  individual  contract  (either  explicit  or  implicit)  between  employer  and
employee.  There  has  been  a  modest  trend  towards  greater  dependency  on  market
mechanisms over the past decade  or so - at least in developed  countries where  most of the
available evidence exists (OECD  1999a).
However, there are well-known arguments for public policy intervention  in the labor
market,  as  well.  These  arguments  pivot  on  the  need  to  address  market  failures  and
injustice/exploitation.  In the World Development  Report,  Workers in an Integrating World,
the World Bank (1995) highlighted four reasons for public intervention in the labor market:
*  Uneven  market power.  Workers  may  find  themselves  in  a  weak  bargaining
position. This can raise  concerns  about their protection from unjust treatment.  It can
also have longer-term efficiency  losses.
*  Discrimination.  Workers belonging to groups with little voice or power (e.g., due
to age,  gender,  ethnicity,  etc.)  may experience  particular  disadvantages  in the labor
market. This also raises both equity and efficiency concerns.
'Informal  mechanisms  also come into play,  as noted in  the introduction. However,  given our focus on policy
options in this paper, we limit our discussion to formal and market-based  mechanisms.
3*  Insufficient information.  Workers  and  some  employers  may  not have  adequate
information  to  make  informned  decisions  about  the  conditions  of work.  Health  and
safety hazards  are the classic example.
*  Inadequate insurance against risk.  Workers  are  typically  unable  to  formnally
insure  themselves  against  labor  market-related  risks  associated,  for  example,  with
unemployment, disability, or old age.
These arguments  underlie  public policy  interventions  to support the  other modes of
labor market regulation.
Statutory  regulation  is  the  classic  notion  of regulation  --  rules  and  procedures
established  by laws  and  decrees  that  govern aspects of the  employment relationship.  These
can cover  a wide range  of areas:  for example, the establishment  and protection of universal
worker  rights;  the protection  of vulnerable  groups  of workers;  principles  for determining
compensation;  working  conditions;  and the  initiation  and  termination  of the  employment
relationship.2 Table  1 provides examples in these areas of statutory regulation.
Table 1: Examples  of Statutory Regulation
Type of intervention  Specific  examples
Establishment and protection  Right to associate
of universal workers rights  Right to bargain collectively
Right to contest dismissals and disciplinary actions
Protection of vulnerable groups  Minimum working age
Equality of employment  opportunities
Equal pay
Determining compensation  Minimum wage
Overtime payments
Mandatory non-wage benefits
Working conditions  Occupational  health and safety standards
Maximum working hours
Minimum number of holidays
Initiation/termination  of  Fixed-term  contracting
employment relationship  Reasons  for dismissal
Advance notice and severance requirements
Source:  Based on World Bank (1995),  Table 1  1.1
The other mode of regulation,  collective  voice,  refers to the voluntary negotiation and
administration of the employment relationship where workers (and sometimes employers) are
2 These regulations  can take  a number of forms (Standing  1999): protective regulations; fiscal regulations  (e.g.,
taxes or subsidies to encourage  or discourage certain forms of activity); promotional regulations;  repressive or
preventative regulations;  and facilitating  regulations (to permit certain activities to take place).
4represented  collectively.  This  mode  of  regulation  can  occur  at  different  levels  (e.g.,
enterprise,  sector,  or nationally)  and with various  degrees  of coordination.  In  developing
countries,  only  a  minority  of workers  are  covered  by  collective  bargaining;  often  this
minority  is  quite  small  and  concentrated  in the  public  sector.  Moreover,  the  reach of the
collective  voice  mode  likely  has  receded  somewhat  if union  membership  trends  are  any
indication.  As  Table  2  indicates,  union membership  declined  in many  countries  during  the
late  1980s and through the 1  990s.
Table 2: Union Membership Trends by Region,  mid-1980s to mid-1990s
Percentage point change  in union density, mid-1980s  to mid-1990s
Decline of more than 10  Decline of up to 10  Gain of  up to  10  Gain of more than
points  points  points  10 points




Latin America  Argentina (-29)  Colombia (4)  Chile (+4)
Costa Rica (-13)  Dominican Rep. (-2)  El Salvador (+2)
Mexico (-17)  Guatemala (-4)
Venezuela (-13)  Uruguay (-8)
Asia  India (-11)  Bangladesh (-8)  Korea (+0.4)
Pakistan (-1)  Philippines (+6)
Thailand (-0.1)
Eastern Europe  Azerbaijan (-33)  Bulgaria (-4)  Turkey (+4)  Malta (+17)
and Central Asia  Czech Rep. (-34)  Cyprus (-9)




Industrialized  Australia (-20)  Canada (-7)  Hong Kong (+4)
Israel (-77)  United  States (-4)  Belgium (+3)
New Zealand (-22)  Japan (-6)  Finland (+10)
Austria (-13)  Singapore (-4)  Spain (+7)
Greece (-12)  Denmark (-3)  Sweden (+7)
Ireland (-14)  France (-4)






Total number [%]  19 [32.8]  26 [44.8]  11  [19.0]  2 [3.4]
Developing  12  [35.3]  14 [41.2]  6 [17.61  2 [5.9]
countries
Developed  7 [29.2]  12  [50.0]  5 [20.8]  0 [0.0]
countries
Source:  ILO (2000a)
5Obviously,  the  effectiveness  of  different  modes  of  regulation  can  vary  greatly
depending  on the  particular  circumstances.  A  statutory  approach  may  achieve  its  intended
objectives  in one  setting  but be  inappropriate  or unenforceable  in another.  Similarly,  markets
operate  with  varying  effectiveness,  as  does  collective  bargaining.  However,  each  of these
modes  of  regulation  does  have  inherent  strengths  as  well  as  potential  risks.  These  are
summarized in Table 3.3
Table 3: Some Potential Strengths and Risks of Market, Statutory, and Collective  Voice
Regulation
Potential strengths  Potential risks
Market-based  Enhances  flexibility  Market failures
Efficient allocation  "Short-termism"
Low transaction costs  Discrimination
Statutory  Predictability  Rigidity
Can address equity concerns  Monitoring costs
Provides monitoring mechanisms  Moral hazards
Collective voice  Can promote long-term  investments  Time consuming
Provides self-monitoring  Insider-outsider  differences
There  is  considerable  variation  across  countries  in  terms  of how  labor  markets  are
actually  regulated.  An  important  determinant  is  the  national  legal  and  cultural  tradition.  In
countries  with  Anglo-Saxon  heritage  where  common  law  principles  prevail,  voluntarily
negotiated  contracts between workers  and employers  (either individual  or collective)  typically
play  a  large  part.  In  principle,  statutory  regulation  plays  a  smaller  role  here  in  directly
regulating the employment relationship than it does in countries  with civil law principles (e.g.,
French  or  Spanish  tradition)  or in  countries  that  were  part of the  Soviet  bloc.  The  stage  of
development  does not seem to be an important  determinant of labor market regulation,  at least
in its formal  sense.  Developing  countries  often have  very strong statutory  regulation through
interventionist  Labor  Codes,  for  example.  However,  due  to  institutional  limitations  and
economic  structure,  labor markets in many developing  countries are  actually regulated  largely
through market or informal means.
3. INTERNATIONAL  EVIDENCE ON THE LABOR MARKET IMPACTS OF
3 This table draws on Standing (1999) as well as the authors'  assessments.
0EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION  AND WAGE DETERMINATION  REGULATIONS
Labor  market regulation  can affect a wide range  of social and  economic  outcomes.  In
terms of the  economy,  these  impacts  can  include macroeconomic  adjustments,  consumption
patterns,  productivity,  and  human  capital  investments.  However,  our  focus  here  is  on  the
evidence  pertaining  to  labor  market  outcomes  in  particular.  We  review  the  international
literature  on  employment protection,  including hiring  and  contracting  and  dismissals,  and  on
wage-setting,  including  minimum  wages  and  collective  bargaining.  For  each,  we  cover  the
range of approaches  used and what is known about  their labor market  effects.  In addition,  we
have compiled  a series of tables in the annex  that summarize  the legal  arrangements  in these
areas for a selection of countries.
Before  turning  to  the  evidence,  some  comments  should  be  made  on  the  empirical
analysis of the impacts of labor market regulations.
First,  conclusions  based  on  international  comparative  research  must  be  drawn  with
caution.  Based on multi-country  samples,  statistical associations can be found between certain
labor  market  regulations  and  particular  labor  market  outcomes.  However,  national  contexts
(history, culture,  institutions) matter a great deal, both in explaining why a particular regulatory
approach has been used and the labor market impacts.  So the effects of a given law or practice
in one country may be quite different from those observed in another.
Second,  there  are  measurement  issues  involved  in  capturing  actual  regulatory
arrangements.4 These  are  very  difficult  where  arrangements  are  established  by  collective
agreements,  industry  practice,  or through  some  other non-statutory  mechanism.  As  a result,
researchers  tend to focus  on aspects  that are typically covered by labor codes and  other legal
instruments.  Even  here,  though,  measurement  remains  a  problem.  The  interpretation  of
legislation  in the  courts  can  have  an important  impact  on how the  labor  market  is  actually
regulated.  Similarly, the actual practice  may exceed legal  requirements  because of convention
or collective  agreements,  or fail  to meet them  if laws are  not enforced.  Coverage  is  also  an
issue.  By necessity,  most studies  are limited  to the regulation  of regular employment  in the
formal sector. However,  this becomes increasingly  problematic  as more workers  are employed
4  See OECD (1  999a) and Bertola, Boeri, and Cazes (2000) for discussions of these problems.in atypical or non-standard jobs (especially in developed countries) or in the informal sector (in
developing countries).
Third, actually  quantifying  regulations  is often difficult.  Employment protection (hiring
and  firing  rules)  offers  a  good  example.  As  a  result,  most  studies  based  on  multi-country
samples  use  qualitative  rankings  - for  example,  from  least  to  most  flexible,  based  on  the
content of the law. Ideally,  a measure  of the degree of employment  protection  (or some other
regulatory  aspect)  should  be  a  monetary-equivalent  However,  as  Bertola,  Boeri,  and  Cazes
(2000)  point  out,  "translating  laws  and  words  into  actual  and  expected  costs  is  almost
impossible."  Not surprisingly,  with a couple  of exceptions  (Lazear  1990;  Heckman and  Pages
2000), this has not been done.
Fourth, even where statistically significant associations are found between labor market
regulations  and labor market outcomes, the causal relationship may be more complicated.  Other
factors, that  are not included in the  analysis, may be correlated  with both.  For example,  some
economists  are  now  looking  at  how the  regulation  of the  product  market  interacts  with  the
regulation  of the labor  market  and what  the  result  is for  employment  outcomes  (e.g.,  Boeri,
Nicoletti, and Scarpetta 2000).5
Finally,  most  of the  research  is based  on  the  experiences  of countries  in  the  OECD
region.  To a lesser extent, there has been  some analysis on Latin American  countries,  much of
it recent  and sponsored by the Inter-American Development  Bank. However,  for the most part,
the  empirical  research  on  developing  countries  is  scant.  This  raises  the  question  of the
generalizability  of  findings  across  countries.  Developing  countries  have  some  unique
characteristics  that would  seem  relevant  - most  notably,  large  informal  sectors  and  limited
enforcement.
(a) Employment  protection
Employment  protection,  or job  security,  rules refer to hiring  and firing  arrangements.
These can cover what kinds of contracts are permitted, any special rules favoring certain groups
in  hiring,  occupational  standards,  the  conditions  under  which  workers  can  be  terminated,
requirements  for  severance  and  advance  notice  of termination,  redundancy  procedures,  and
special  rules  for  mass  layoffs.  Employment  protection  is  typically  considered  along  a
5 Boeri, Nicoletti, and Scarpetta (2000) show that in OECD countries, these two areas of regulation are correlated
- i.e., where employment protection rules are strong, product markets are also highly regulated.
2"rigidity/flexibility"  continuum.  At  the  rigid end,  non-regular  contracting  is  restricted,  hiring
standards may be in force, employer dismissal rights are controlled,  and severance,  notice, and
administrative  requirements  are  substantial.  At  the  flexible  end,  statutory  (or  collectively
bargained)  regulations are minimal and market mechanisms largely determine hiring and firing.
The  idea  behind  most  employment  protection  rules  is  to  enhance  job  security  by
making  dismissal  costly  to  the  employer.  However,  by  making  dismissals  more  costly,
employment  protection  regulations  can  also  have  the  unintended  effect  of  creating  hiring
disincentives  for  employers.  There  are  various  ways  in  which  these  rules  can  affect  labor
market outcomes including employment levels,  labor dynamics (i.e., employment fluctuations),
and the composition of employment.
Theoretically,  the  clearest  effects  are  on  labor  market  dynamics  - employment
protection rules can be  expected  to lengthen job tenure and  reduce labor turnover.6 All other
things being equal,  then, stronger job security rules will stabilize employment levels, not only
reducing  layoffs  in downturns  but also  reducing  hiring  in upturns.  This  will  protect jobs  for
incumbent employees  but limit  hiring  opportunities  for the unemployed.  As a result,  we can
expect the duration  of unemployment  (as well as employment)  to be positively related to the
degree of employment protection.
The  impact  of  employment  protection  on  the  average  level  of  employment  (and
unemployment)  through  the  business  cycle,  however,  is  more  ambiguous.  Whether
employment  rates  within  the  firm  increase  or  decrease  with  greater  employment  protection
depends  on how the decline in hiring compares  with the decline in firing.  This in turn depends
on assumptions  about the persistence of labor demand  shocks,  the elasticity of labor demand,
how  firms  discount  future  firing  costs  at  the  time of hiring,  and  so on.7 Job  security rules,
however,  should  affect  the  composition of employment  in various  ways:  depending  on  the
details,  they  can  shift  labor  demand  to  uncovered  (informal)  sectors,  firms,  or employment
types.
(i) Dismissals
6  This longer tenure can have indirect effects, including more in-service training.
7  However, the entry and exit of firms may also be affected by hiring and firing costs. Hopenhayn  and Rogerson
(1993) develop a model whereby higher costs lead to an decrease in employment in  new firms.
3The  key  policy  issue  concerns  how  difficult  and/or  costly  it  is  for  employers  to
terminate  regular (i.e.,  permanent)  employees  for  economic  reasons.8 Restrictions  can  take
various  forms:  (i) what is considered  to  be  a justifiable reason for termination;  (ii)  severance
obligations;  (iii) advance notice requirements; and (iv) necessary administrative  procedures  for
laying off workers.  There may also be special requirements  in the case of mass layoffs.  These
restrictions  are  often  found  in  national  or  sub-national  labor  codes  but,  depending  on  the
country, the degree of job security can also be defined by court decisions,  collective bargaining
agreements,  or even unwritten industrial norms.
There  are  significant  variations  across  countries  in terms  of the  protection  offered  to
regular workers.  Drawing  on the annex,  Table 4 provides  examples of statutory arrangements
regarding  what  are  legally  acceptable  reasons  for  economic  dismissals;  what  severance
requirements  exist;  and  what  advance  notice  is  required.9 The  United  States  has  the  least
restrictive  employment  protection  laws:  there  are  no restrictions  on  dismissals  in the private
sector,  no statutory severance  obligations, and  advance notice requirements  only in the case of
mass layoffs. In reality, employers in the U.S. do face some constraints on their dismissal rights
because of court decisions  and collective agreement  provisions. As the table shows,  however,
other countries have  various statutory employment  protections - ruling  out certain reasons  for
laying off workers and imposing severance  and advance notice obligations.
During the past decade  or so, there has been no clear trend in regulating  dismissals in
OECD  countries;  some  have  strengthened  protections,  others  have  eased  them,  but  in  most
cases,  arrangements  have  remained  relatively  stable.  In  many  Latin  American  countries,
however, job security rules have been scaled back.
Measuring  the  degree  of job  security  protection  is  difficult.  There  have  been  three
approaches.  Most  studies  have  created  ordinal  indices  based  on the  statutory  rules,  such  as
those summarized in Table 4 (e.g., OECD  1999a). Another approach,  and the most ambitious
8  "Regular"  employees  are meant to cover those with a permanent or indeterminate position. It excludes fixed-term
or  temporary  workers.  The  discussion  does  not  include  dismissals  for  "non-economic"  reasons  such  as
discrimination,  union organizing, or job performance.
9 These countries have been selected from the countries  in the annex table to have some geographical diversity and
a range of approaches.
4Table 4: Legal Arrangements for Termination, Selected  Countries
Justifiable reasons for  Severance  requirements  Advance notice required
economic  dismissal
Chile  Economic  reasons include  . 30 days wage per year  . 30 days, dismissal without
modernization  activities,  of service if dismissed  cause or economic reason;
reduced productivity,  economic reasons.  . With cause, written
changes  in market,  etc.  (upper limit = 330  justification required for
days).  worker and labor
20% premium if  inspectorate  within 3 days
dismissal  is unfair  after termination;
Czech  . Employer shuts down  2 months pay, in case of  *  3 months if employer
Republic  or relocates;  shut down, relocation,  shuts down or relocates and
. Employer ceases to  transfer of employer,  or  for redundancy;
exist or merger or  redundancy.  *  2 months for other
acquisition  reasons.
*  New technology or
reorganization to
increase efficiency
Ethiopia  . Decline in demand for  *  30  days wages  for first  . I month  if employed  <  I
the products or services  year of service.  year;
of the employer;  *  1/3  monthly  salary  for  *  2 months if employed> 1
*  Alteration in work  every  additional  year  of  year;
methods or new  service (12 month limit)  *  I month if reduction of
technology to increase  . Additional 60 days pay  workforce
productivity.  if mass layoff.
Germany  Compelling business or  No legal entitlement but  *  Progressive increase based
operational  needs  often included in collective  on years of service (from 2
agreements  weeks to 7 months for >20
years of service)
*  1 month delay required
after public notice for
mass layoffs
Japan  *  Rational restructuring  No legal entitlement but  *  30 days notice
reason or unavoidable  most large enterprises have  *  Notification also to Public
redundancy (court  voluntary plan  Employment  Security
precedence,  not law)  Office  in mass layoff (>30
*  Reasonable  selection  workers)
criteria
Spain  Economic redundancy  20 days'  wages for each  *  30 days notice
year of service (up to 12  . for mass layoffs,
years)  consultation required  for
30/15  days in firms with
50+1<50  employees
United States  No restriction (except in  No legal requirement but  *  No regulation for
public sector)  voluntary or negotiated  individual  dismissal
policies exist  *  60 days notice for mass
_____________  _I_  layoffs
one,  is to calculate the costs to employers of complying with employment protection rules. The
most complete effort to do this has been conducted by Heckman and Pagds (2000) who create a
5job security index which attempts to measure  the expected  future cost,  at the time of hiring, of
dismissing  the  'w rker  for  economic  reasons.10 A  third  approach,  used  by  Di  Tella  and
MacCulloch  (1999),  is  based  on the judgment  of executives  in  different  countries  regarding
how  hard  it is  to adjust  employment  levels  to  economic  realities."  These  different  methods
have strengths and weaknesses.  In general,  they do lead to a fairly consistent picture of which
countries have rigid employment protection and which do not. For example, the U.S. comes out
as the country with the most flexible arrangements using each method.
Turning  to  results,  strict  limitations  on  terminating  (for  economic  reasons)  regular
employees are generally  associated with:12
*  Lower labor turnover rates (hirings plus separations);
*  Lower aggregate employment levels; but greater numbers of long-tenure jobs;
*  Lower labor force participation rates;
*  No clear impact on unemployment levels; but longer average unemployment  durations;
. At  a  macro  level,  slower  recovery  from  an  aggregate  shock  to  an  equilibrium
unemployment  rate;
*  More self-employment  as a share of total employment;
*  More  nonstandard  employment  (e.g.,  part-time  or  temporary),  though  there  is  less
consensus on this; and
*  Positive  employment  effects  for  skilled  prime-age  males  but  lower  employment  for
women, young people,  and less-skilled workers.
Consistent with the theory, the empirical findings are strongest for the dynamic effects -
on turnover and tenure and flows between employment and unemployment.  They are also very
consistent in terms of who benefits from employment protection rules and who does not.
On  the  other  hand,  the  findings  on  employment  and  unemployment  levels  are  less
consistent and often statistically insignificant.  This could suggest that the actual importance  of
employment  protection  arrangements  might be  less than many  economists  would  assume.  In
this respect, it has been shown that employers and employees can design labor contracts that, in
10 Specifically, the Heckman-Pages measure includes the cost of  complying with severance and advance notice
requirements.  The details of this index are described  in the appendix to Heckman and Pages (2000).
"1  This  is  based  on  data  collected  from  the  World  Competitiveness  Report  which asks  executives  how  much
flexibility they have  to  adjust things  like compensation  and employment  levels to  economic realities.  The scale
ranges from 0-100.
12  These  conclusions  have  been  drawn  from  various  studies  including  OECD  (1999a,b);  Nickell  and  Layard
(1997); Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta (1998); Lazear (1990); and Di Tella and MacCulloch (1999).
6effect,  undo any mandated job security requirements  (Lazear  1990).  However,  they could also
reflect  measurement  problems,  especially  with  the  ordinal  ranking  indicator  that  has
characterized much of research particularly in OECD countries. 13
It is interesting to note that the research in the Latin American region has tended to find
much clearer evidence  of negative employment  effects of job security rules. This could be due
to  different  methodologies  - strong  results  have  been  found  by  Heckman  and  Pages  (2000)
using  their  cost-based  estimate  and  in  a  number  of country  case  studies  (summarized  in
Heckman  and Pages 2000).  It may also reflect the fact that Latin American  countries tend to
have stricter employment protection than OECD countries with the result that impacts are more
visible. 14
Overall, rules to protect job security increase the number of stable jobs but this seems to
come at the price of more long-term unemployment and non-participation  in the labor force and
probably  less  formal-sector  employment.  They increase  the  protection  available  for  "insider"
incumbent employees  but reduce access of "outsiders" to formal, paid employment. As we will
see below, these effects are reinforced where restrictions  on hiring "non-standard" employment
also exist.
(ii) Hiring  and  contracting
The most important policy issue here  concerns the rules for employing "non-standard"
workers  - specifically,  employees  on  fixed-term  contracts  and  temporary  agency  workers.
Restrictions  in  these  areas  are  akin  to job  security  protections  by  limiting  the  number  of
workers who do not have access to such protection. These forms of contracting typically do not
involve  significant  dismissal  costs.  So,  in  theory,  their  effects  should  be  similar  to  those
stemming from job security rules.
There  are  a number  of aspects  to the regulation  of fixed-term  and temporary  agency
employment  but they  generally  pertain to (i) the  types of work (e.g.,  occupations)  for which
these  forms  of  employment  are  legal,  and  (ii)  the  maximum  duration  allowed.  Table  5
summarizes  the  statutory  rules  in these  areas  for  the  same  set  of countries  included  in the
13  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  Di  Tella  and  MacCulloch  (1999)  study,  which  uses  a  qualitative  measure  of
employment  protection,  finds  stronger  impacts  than  virtually  all  of the other  studies  that  attempt  to use  more
formal, quantitative  measures.
14 The strong results found by Heckman and Pages are somewhat  surprising in  that they would seem to imply that
enforcement of employment protection rules in Latin American countries  is effective in altering behavior.
7previous table.  The table demonstrates  the considerable  variation that exists. During the 1  990s,
at least in developed  countries,  there  has generally  been a loosening  of restrictions  with many
countries  broadening  the  use  of fixed-term  contracts  and  temporary  agency  work  (OECD
1  999b).
The  most  extensive  study  of  the  labor  market  impacts  of  different  contracting
arrangements  was carried  out  by the  OECD (1999a),  based  on the experience  of its  member
countries.  Unfortunately,  there  is  little  empirical  evidence  for  developing  or  transition
countries.  According  to  the  OECD  analysis,  strict  limitations  on the  use  of fixed-term  and
temporary agency  )ntracting are associated  with:
*  Lower aggregate  employment rates;
*  Lower employment for women and young people;
*  Higher levels of self-employment  (as a share of total employment);
*  No impact on aggregate unemployment  levels; and
*  Lower flows into unemployment but longer average unemployment  durations.
As  we  have  already noted,  at least  in the  OECD countries,  restrictions  on the  use  of
non-standard employment reinforce job security rules that constrain employer dismissal rights.
Where  regulations  are  strong,  regular employees have job security  and the economy  has more
stable  employment.  However,  there  generally  is  less dynamism  in the labor market.  There  is
also  less  opportunity  for  regular  employment  in  the  formal  sector.  This  increases  the
vulnerability  of certain  groups of workers  including  women  and  youth,  and the unskilled  or
poorly educated  who  are  less  likely to get these jobs.  Many of these workers,  then,  will  be
relegated to either being out of the labor force or to the informal  sector. This has to be assessed
against  weaker  job  protection  rules  which  do  not  discourage  formal  sector  jobs  but
accommodate a lower level of protection in these jobs.
8Table 5: Legal Arrangements for Fixed-Term Contracts and Temporary Agency  Work,
Selected  Countries
Fixed-Term Contracts  Temporary Agency  Work
Chile  Maximum duration one year after which the
contract becomes one of indeterminate
duration.
Czech  Fixed not allowed for the following:
Republic  *  graduates  university-level schools or  No restriction
specialist apprentice schools hired for
work that corresponds to their
qualifications;
*  adolescents;
*  employees under collective bargaining
agreement;
. disabled persons
Ethiopia  Pernitted only in the following cases:  Licenses for private employment agencies
. specified piece work;  are required from regional or national
*  temporary  replacement  of  absent  authorities, depending  on scope  of
worker;  activities.
. urgent work to prevent damage or disaster
to life or property;
*  work relating to the industry but
perforned at irregular intervals;
. seasonal work;
Germany  *  Widely possible without justification  Generally approved except for construction
*  Maximum number of  4 contracts/24
months (no limits in justified cases)
Japan  *  < I year duration without restriction  Restricted to specific occupations
*  up to 3 years for particular types of
workers
Spain  Permitted for various reasons (e.g., specific  Legal for justifiable  cases
projects; temporary replacements; training
contracts;  production eventualities; special
categories  of workers; long-termn unemployed)
United  No restrictions  No restrictions
States  I
(b) Wage determination
There  are different  ways in which  the process  of wage  determination  can  vary across
countries.  These can be determined by laws (e.g.,  minimum wage, collective  bargaining rules),
institutions  (e.g.,  nature  of unions),  or  industrial  practice  (e.g.,  norms  on wage  differentials).
Here  we  consider the international  evidence  on the  employment  and earnings  effects  of two
aspects  of wage regulation:  minimum wages  and collective  bargaining.  Much of this evidence
is based on the experience of industrialized countries.
(i) Minimum wages
9Like  the other  aspects  of labor  market  regulation  discussed  in  this paper,  the role  of
minimum wages  is controversial.  The underlying  idea is quite  simple - to  set a floor on what
employers can pay in  order to  ensure that employees  receive  a "fair,  living wage" and thus to
support the incomes of low-wage  workers and their families.  However, while minimum wages
can boost the earnings of low-income employees,  they can also eliminate jobs where employers
are  unwilling  to hire  at the  minimum wage.  The  different  views  on minimum  wage policies
essentially  hinge  on  the relative  weight  attached  to  these  positive  and  negative  effects.  The
controversy has heightened in recent years because of conflicting  evidence regarding the actual
employment impacts of increases in minimum wages.
According  to  simple,  perfectly  competitive  models  of the  labor  market,  a  minimum
wage which  is set above the market-clearing  wage will result in a decline  in labor demand and
a  lower equilibrium level of employment.'5 However,  there are alternative  models of the labor
market (for example, where  firms have some  wage-setting  discretion  and where workers have
little bargaining power) that predict neutral  or even positive employment  effects. In general, we
would expect minimum wages to reduce earnings inequality, by eliminating very low wages.  In
terms  of its  impacts  on total income  inequality  and  poverty,  the  theoretical  expectations  are
more  complex and indeterminate.
Most (but not all) industrialized countries  and some developing countries have statutory
minimum  wages.  The  actual  regulation  can  have  several  dimensions:  (i)  the  level  set;  (ii)
coverage;  (iii)  differentiation  in the  level  (e.g.,  by age,  sector,  region);  (iv) how  the  level  is
adjusted to reflect inflation; and (v) how the level  is set (e.g.,  by government  or by the social
partners).  The annex table includes the statutory regulations for minimum wages in a selection
of countries.
Figure  1 shows the  ratio of the minimum  wage to  the  mean  wage  for a selection  of
industrialized  and Latin  America  countries  (generally for the  late  1990s).  This  illustrates the
great variation  in the level  set, ranging from Venezuela where  the  statutory minimum  is very
near  to  the  average  wage  to  Uruguay  where  the  it  is  less  than  20%  of the  mean.  In  some
transition countries  where the value of the minimum wage has fallen substantially  over the past
decade, the ratio is even lower;  in Russia, for example,  in 2000, the minimum wage was about
5% of the average (Betcherman and Kuddo 2001).
5 For a concise review of  the theory regarding the employment impacts of the minimum wage,  see OECD (1998).
10The impact of the statutory minimum wage on the labor market depends heavily on how
high it is set. Naturally,  countries with low minimum wage levels  (relative to mean wages) tend
to  have  low  incidence  rates,  i.e.,  the  percentage  of the  workforce  that  is  affected  by  the
minimum  wage.  The OECD (1999a)  has estimated  the incidence  for seven member  countries
including  Mexico,  Poland,  and  Hungary.  For  the  countries  covered,  the  percentage  of the
workforce  with  wages  at  or  below  the  minimum  ranged  from  4%  to  18%.  During  the  past
decade,  there has been a general decline  in minimum wage  levels,  either  in real terms or as a
percentage of average wages (OECD 1998,  1  999b).  It would be expected that the incidence rate
would decline  accordingly.  In some  countries, the  level  is too low to  make a difference.  The
general  trend  towards  declining  real minimum wages presumably  has  led to weakening  of its
impacts on employment and earnings.
As noted  earlier,  much of the  empirical  research  on the impacts  of minimum wage  is
based  on  the  experience  of industrialized  countries,  especially  the United  States.  (Here,  too,
whatever scanty evidence there is from developing countries largely pertains to Latin America.)
The generalizability  of the industrialized  experience  to less developed countries  is unclear.  On
the one hand, enforcement  is weaker  in developing  countries which would  suggest that effects
would be minimized.16 On the other hand, according  to a sample of 17 countries analyzed  by
the  World  Bank  (1995),  the  level  of the  minimum  wage  (relative  to  average  wages)  is
negatively correlated  with national income. If this is the case, then poorer countries can expect
to experience  stronger  impacts.  Certainly,  the relationship  between the  level  of the minimum
wage  and its employment  effects seems to hold in developing  countries.  Where  the minimum
wage  is  relatively  high,  effects  are  significant  and  where  it is low,  effects  appear to be less
important.' 7
Much  of  the  empirical  debate  about  minimum  wages  concerns  their  impact  on
employment  levels.  The  conventional  wisdom  among  economists  that  there  is  a  negative
employment  effect  was  challenged  by  Card  and  Krueger  (1995)  who  found  an  increase  in
employment in the U.S.  fast-food industry following an increase  in the minimum wage.  Since
this high-profile study was released,  there have been numerous  challenges and rejoinders  with
16 This is especially true of the small-firm sector.  Evidence reported in the World Bank (1995)  for five developing
countries indicates that non-compliance  among small firms with respect to minimum wages ranged from just over
40% to almost 100%.
17  For example, see the study by Bell (1997) on Mexico and Colombia.
11the result that, at least in the U.S., the~ debate  is very much alive (e.g.,  Neumark and Wascher
2000; Card and Krueger 2000).
An  international  review  by  the  OECD  (1998)  based  on  nine  member  countries
concluded  that  there  is  a  significant  negative  employment  effect  for  teenagers  - in  the
neighborhood  of a 2-4% decline in employment for a 10% increase in the minimum wage.  This
impact  then diminishes  for  successive  age  groups,  effectively  disappearing  for  the prime-age
group.  A  number  of  other  studies  in  developed  countries  have  also  found  modest  or
insignificant  employment  effects  on  an  aggregate  basis but  significant  negative  effects  once
analysis  has  focused on  workers  actually  constrained  by the minimum  wage  (e.g.,  youth  and
other low-wage workers).
In Latin America,  Maloney and Nuniez (2000)  make the argument that minimum wages
in  that  region  seem  to  have  employment  effects  in  the  informal  sector  - a  position  that
challenges  the conventional wisdom that this sector is unaffected  by such regulations." 8 If this
is indeed the  case, Maloney and Nufiez  (2000) conjecture  that the overall  impact of minimum
wages in the region may be substantially  greater than previously thought.
Can minimum wages reduce inequality and poverty?  On the distributional  side,  studies
(industrialized  countries almost exclusively)  have found that higher minimum  wages do reduce
the  dispersion  of earnings  and  the  incidence  of low  pay.  They  also  tend  to  narrow  wage
differentials  between demographic  groups (e.g., age and gender).  In some developed countries
with large numbers of "working poor," increases  in minimum wages have had modest impacts
on poverty;  however,  the OECD  (1998)  has concluded  that minimum  wages  can play only  a
relatively  minor role compared  with other factors  (e.g.,  macroeconomic  conditions,  generosity
of public assistance).  The World Bank (1995) has concluded that minimum wages are unlikely
to  be  a  very  effective  anti-poverty  instrument  in  developing  countries  because  of  poor
enforcement  and  limited  coverage,  especially  among  the  poorest.  However,  recent  studies
indicating  that minimum wages  seem to have  some  impact in informal  sectors would suggest
that this  policy  intervention  might  indeed  have  a greater  anti-poverty  effect than previously
thought.' 9
18 Essentially their argument  is that minimum wages take on a general significance as a benchmark of a "fair"
wage.
'9 Lustig and McLeod (1997)  find evidence that minimum wages do reduce poverty in a sample of developing
countries.
12(ii) Collective bargaining
A key  aspect of the  labor market regime  concerns  the role of collective  bargaining  in
determining wages (and other conditions of work). It is well known that, ceteris  paribus,  wages
bargained  collectively are  generally higher than those bargained  individually.  Economists  also
focus  on  how  responsive  wages  determined  through  collective  bargaining  will  be  to  labor
market  conditions.  The  characteristics  of the bargaining  process  (i.e.,  the  structure  in which
bargaining  is  carried  out)  matter  as  well  as  the  extent  of bargaining.  So  researchers  have
attempted to look at both dimensions.  Studies have tended to use two measures  of the extent of
bargaining:  trade  union  density  (union  members  as  a  percentage  of  the  workforce)  and
collective  bargaining  coverage  (percent  of workers  having  wages  determined  by  collective
bargaining).  They have  also  looked  at  two  dimensions  of bargaining  structure:  the degree  of
centralization and the degree of coordination.
There are major differences across countries in terms of the extent of bargaining and the
bargaining  structure.  These  differences  reflect  both  industrial  relations  laws  and  culture  and
practice.  Some  country-level  examples  of  legal  arrangements  governing  the  formation  of
unions  and bargaining are provided in the annex. We have already seen that union membership
(and, presumably, collective  bargaining coverage)  has been declining in many countries  (Table
2).  In terms of bargaining  structure, there  has perhaps been  some shift away  from centralized
and  coordinated  approaches  to  more  enterprise-level  bargaining  but  this  has  not  been  a
universal trend (ILO 2000a).
The World  Bank  has  recently  carried  out a  survey of the literature  on the economic
impacts of unions  and collective  bargaining  (Aidt and Tzannatos  2002,  forthcoming).  Again,
most  of the  empirical  literature  is  based  on  the  experience  of  OECD  countries.  Relevant
conclusions about the labor market effects include the following:20
*  Collective bargaining  increases wages for covered workers by 5-15% (depending on the
country).  The  size  of this  premium  increases  when  total  compensation  is  measured
because unions also bargain for better benefits.
*  Collective  bargaining compresses  the wage distribution and particularly the differential
between skilled and unskilled workers.
*  Job tenure is longer in firms with unions.
20 There are a range of other economic effects  of unions and collective bargaining covering,  for example,
productivity, training,  innovation,  and macroeconomic  performance. However, these are not addressed here.  See
Aidt and Tzannatos (2002, forthcoming)  for a complete review.
13*  At  the  aggregate  level,  bargaining  coverage  (but  not  union  density)  tends  to  be
associated  with higher  real  wage  growth but lower employment  (and in some  studies,
higher unemployment).
*  It is associated with lower earnings inequality.
*  While  coordination  between  employers'  organizations  and  unions  seems  to  have
improved  macroeconomic  and labor market  performance  in the  1970s  and  1980s,  the
evidence  is less clear in the  1  990s.
*  There  is  no  consistent  evidence  on  the  impacts  of the  degree  of centralization  in
collective bargaining.
These observations  emerge from the empirical  analysis of collective  bargaining. Much
more needs to  be known,  however,  about how policy-makers  facilitate  an environment which
maximizes  the  contribution  of collective  bargaining  to employment  and  income  growth  and
poverty reduction.
4. ENFORCEMENT AND  DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Compliance  with  labor  laws  and  valid  labor  contracts  and  the resolution  of disputes
represent  important  elements  of the  labor  market  regulatory  framework.  Unlike  the  issues
covered in the preceding  section, there is virtually no quantitative evidence  on the economic  or
employment  impacts  of different  arrangements.  However,  the  economic  and  social  effects  of
regulatory  practices  relating  to  employment  protection,  wage  determination,  and other issues
are  undoubtedly  enhanced  by  effective  enforcement  and  dispute  resolution.  In  each of these
areas, there is emerging best practice which provides our focus.
14(a) Enforcement
International  best practice  in enforcement has been undergoing  important changes  over
the past decade.  Much of the innovation  has taken place on the occupational health and safety
front.  While  many  of the  new  ideas  likely  can be  applied  to other  aspects  of labor  market
regulation,  the  type  of compliance  issue  does  affect  the  nature  of the  enforcement  task
including,  for example, the relative roles of education, standard-setting,  sanctions, and so on.
Innovations  in the health and safety field reflect new  ideas about the economic impacts
of compliance  - i.e., growing  emphasis on the longer-term  competitive  advantages of healthy,
safe,  and  legally  compliant  workplaces  as opposed  to  the  short-run  benefits  of undercutting
competitors.  New  approaches  are  also  emerging  in  response  to the  increasing  complexity  of
enforcement  in the  labor field, and  the  stretched  resources  of inspection  services  everywhere
(and  especially  in  developing  countries).  Innovations  involve  an  emphasis  on  technical
assistance  as  opposed  to  sanctions,  using  enterprise  compliance  plans  as  benchmarks  for
improving conditions, and involving the social partners.
The  new approaches  do  not exclude  sanctions  because  the  threat  of their  imposition
remains  essential  for  demonstrating  the  rule  of law.  However,  the  experience  in  OECD
countries particularly  with respect to occupational  health and  safety underlines the benefits of
involving employers in developing  their own policies  and implementation  plans. This can save
on the resources  required of the inspectorate  and it increases  the likelihood of compliance  by
employers  who  "own"  the  strategy.  Inspectors  can  then judge  the  enterprise's  performance
against its own plan that is specific to its needs and circumstances  (as opposed to the generality
of legal  requirements).  Some  countries  require  all  enterprises  over  a  certain  size  (e.g.,  50
employees)  to prepare  an annual  plan on improving  working  conditions  and/or to report each
year to the labor inspectorate on progress made (Hammer and Ville  1998).
This evolving approach to compliance still places  important obligations on government.
It must develop  a clear  framework of rights,  obligations,  powers,  structures,  and mechanisms
for enforcement.  An effective  administration  and field inspectorate  is necessary  although  the
role  of inspectors  is changing  with the transition  from  sanctions  to  technical  assistance  and
support. Rather than simply inspecting premises and prosecuting  statutory violations, inspectors
take  on a more "service-minded"  approach  in which they work with  the enterprise  to resolve
15concerns  and  agree  on a  plan  of action.  Advisory,  educational,  and  mediating  skills  become
more important (Hammer and Ville 1998).
One  important  set  of issues  concerns  the  resources  required  for enforcement  and the
appropriate  balance  between  protection  and  costs.  Many  OECD  countries  have  developed
standards  based on "reasonable  practicability"  and "disproportional  measures"  - i.e.,  that costs
of prevention  must  be  in  proportion  with  the  risks  (Von  Richthofenl999).  In  terms  of the
source of funds  for financing labor protection, the general practice  is that costs  should be born
by employers.  In many  countries,  preventative  activities  and inspection  services  are financed
from  the  social  insurance  fund. The ILO recommends  against  funding these  activities  through
fines  as this  will inhibit  the inspectorate's  promotional/educational  role  and  create  incentives
for sanctions (Hammer and Ville 1998).
One challenge faced by all countries relates to where inadequate  resources (e.g., limited
finances,  stretched  inspectorates)  should  be  targeted.  Hammer  and Ville  (1998)  contend that
large employers  and the worst violators need to be the priority. To reach the rest, including  the
huge  numbers  of  smaller  enterprises,  governments  are  trying  a  number  of  alternatives:
involving  organizations  outside  government  (such  as  chambers  of commerce,  trade  unions),
using  the  media  for  national  educational  campaigns,  targeting  inspections,  and  establishing
advisory  services  or  accrediting  private  advisory  service  providers.  Some governments  (e.g.
Zimbabwe,  Japan,  EU)  subsidize  or  provide  tax  incentives  to  small  and  medium-size
enterprises engaging in preventative measures and/or during the transition to new regulations.
(b) Dispute resolution
Effective  dispute  resolution  relies  on three  key principles.  First,  prevention  is  always
better than resolution.  As discussed  above, adequate enforcement of labor laws goes a long way
toward  preventing  labor disputes.  Second,  if dispute  is  unavoidable,  the parties to a  dispute
ought to  attempt to resolve it  themselves.  Third,  if a dispute  cannot be  resolved,  third party
intervention  ought  to  involve  the  disputing  parties  as  much  as  possible  (Heron  and
Vandenabeele,  1999).
In developed  countries,  there  has been increasing  experimentation  with approaches  to
dispute  resolution  that  improve  accessibility  and  minimize  cost  and  time  burdens.  These
innovations  generally  involve  a move  away  from court-based  procedures  and  adversarialism
16and  towards  alternative  non-court  approaches  that  emphasize  fact-finding,  conciliation,  and
arbitration.  Many  of these  newer  approaches  to dispute  resolution  build  on  the  expertise  of
industrial  relations  specialists  as  opposed to legal  experts.  There  is also  growing  interest  in
approaches  that place the primary  responsibility  for the resolution  of disputes with the  social
partners  (i.e.,  management  and  labor),  with  the  government  playing  a  role  of catalyst  and
resource  (e.g.,  through  an  advisory  service  such  as  the  British  Advisory,  Conciliation,  and
Arbitration Service) (Thomason  1993).
The  dominant  innovation  in many  countries  over  the  past half-century  has  been  the
introduction  of administrative  labor  tribunals  as  an  alternative  to  litigation.  Typically,  legal
review of the decisions of these tribunals is available through the court  system.  A World  Bank
study of labor dispute resolution  in the Dominican Republic found that  services offered by the
Labor  Ministry,  either  administrative  procedures  and  alternative  dispute  resolution  (ADR)
approaches  such  as  mediation,  are  an  effective  means  of decongesting  overburdened  labor
courts  (Pastor  and  Vargas  1999).  Workers  participating  in  focus  groups  who  had  used  the
Ministry's  information  and  mediation  services  to  resolve  disputes  were  generally  satisfied.
They preferred  this option over the courts even if it meant settling  for less compensation than
the  labor law stipulated  (e.g.  in disputes over  unpaid wages)  because  it was quicker and less
expensive.
One  trend  with  administrative  labor  tribunals  has  been  to promote  an "investigative"
rather than "adversarial"  approach. This is especially successful where the representation of one
party  (usually  the  employee,  especially  in  non-union  situations)  either  is  absent  or  weak.
Investigative  approaches  are characterized  by  (a)  the  active  role  of the tribunal  authority  or
mediator in prior investigation and leading discussion  during the hearing; (b) the lack of legal,
adversarial  processes  such  as  cross-examination  of  witnesses;  and  (c)  representation  by
industrial relations specialists instead of lawyers (Clark 1999).
Another  related  innovation  is  "extrajudicial  conciliation"  which  has  been  used,  for
example,  in Chile to expedite dismissal-related  disputes.  Labor inspectors  can hear dismissal
claims  in  order  to  determine  the  legality  of  the  dismissal  and  the  amount  of
wages/severance/welfare  benefits due. Hearings inspectors can summon both the employer and
17employee  to  appear.  This  process  has  been  cited  as  a  "good  practice"  in  labor  law
administration by the ILO (2000b).
Alternative  dispute  resolution  approaches  (i.e.,  that do  not involve  court  procedures)
have  a  number  of advantages.  They  can  be  fast,  informal,  and  simple  without  requiring
expensive technical  expertise. As well, they give the parties control of the process; for example,
both  generally  must agree  on  "neutrals"  such  as  conciliators,  mediators,  and arbitrators.  By
definition, ADR is  less antagonistic  and can preserve  working relationships.  Since  settlements
are not usually in the public record, they also protect the privacy of the parties.
There  are  some  disadvantages,  however.  One  is  a  lack  of transparency.  Also,  due
process  considerations  including  rules  of evidence,  the  right  to  representation,  the  right  of
appeal,  and  other basic  court  procedures  are  not a part of these  alternative  dispute  resolution
approaches.  These  considerations  have  been  relevant  in  the  transition  countries  of Eastern
Europe  where  both  workers  and  employers  have  been concerned  about the predictability  and
legitimacy of resolution outcomes  - and,  as a result,  have tended to continue  to rely on court
procedures.  However,  to  address  such  concerns,  some  countries  and  organizations  have
developed  guidelines  such  as  the  Due  Process  Protocol  adopted  by  the  American  Bar
Association  to  ensure  that  the  rights  of each  party  are  protected.  Despite  these  concerns,
alternative  dispute  resolution  is  largely  considered  a  fair  and  effective  means  of resolving
employment  disputes  and  reducing  the  backlog  in  courts  and  government-sponsored  labor
tribunals (Zack  1997).
Introducing ADR in developing countries requires careful consideration of many issues:
support  of cultural  and  institutional  norms;  availability  of  trained  or  trainable  mediators;
sustainable financing;  and adequate legal foundation  (Chigas and Fairman, 2000).  It may be an
appropriate  policy option where costs,  court  backlog,  and  complex procedures  limit access to
the judicial  system.  It may not be the appropriate priority in judicial reform,  however,  where
there  is a need to  establish legal standards  and protect individual  and group rights.  ADR does
not always  improve  efficiency and  may require  additional  simultaneous  reforms  such as  case
managements  systems.  For  example,  when  initially  introduced  in  Tanzania,  ADR  created
another level  of procedure  actually  increasing  court  delay.  In Ghana,  ADR was initiated  only
after studying of  the sources of delay in the court system (Shuker, 2000).
185. CONCLUSION
Market failures and exploitation and injustice motivate policy interventions  in the labor
market.  However,  countries  choose  to regulate  labor markets  in different  ways,  relying  on a
mix  of  statutory  and  collective  voice  approaches  to  complement  market  and  informal
mechanisms.  Each  mode of regulation has generic  strengths  and weaknesses but it is important
to understand that country-specific  factors remain very important.
There  are  divergent  views  on labor  market regulation,  ranging  from the  institutional
perspective,  which  emphasizes  the value  of public  standards  and collective  bargaining,  to the
market-oriented  perspective,  which emphasizes  the  distortions caused by these  institutions.  In
the final analysis,  it is performance  that matters - i.e.,  finding approaches  that redress  market
failures and injustice and exploitation while having positive effects on labor demand (as well as
other economic variables).  Unfortunately,  assembling empirical  evidence  on the economic  and
social outcomes of different approaches to regulation is a challenge. However,  in this paper, we
have  summarized  the  conclusions  on  what  is  known  about  the  labor  market  impacts  of
employment  protection  regulation  and  wage  determination.  Much  more  needs  to be  known,
however,  especially  within  the  context of developing  countries.  In  comparison to  developed
countries, the market  failures and exploitation that provide justification  for policy intervention
are greater in developing countries.  However, the regulatory capacity in these countries  and the
large informal sectors limit effectiveness of these interventions.
There  are a number of other aspects  to the regulation of the labor market that have not
been  covered  in this paper but require  more  attention.  In  concluding  this paper,  we  mention
three that are important  for policy-makers.  The first concerns the substitutability between labor
market  regulation  and  other  approaches  to  social  protection.  For  example,  employment
protection  laws  and  unemployment  benefit  programs  exist  to  manage  the  risks  of
unemployment faced by workers.  What are the relative merits of these two approaches  and for
whom?  Which  offers  the  most  protection  in  a  cost-effective  manner?  Second,  political
economy issues are a key aspect of labor market regulation that need to be better understood.2'
There  are always  winners  and losers when the rules governing  the  labor market are reformed
and because of the immediacy of employment,  changes are bound to be hotly contested.  How
2'A  couple of recent exceptions are Forteza and Rama (2000) and Saint-Paul (1999).
19can  policy-makers  assess  the  political  economy  aspects  and  structure  the  reform  process to
achieve better regulatory  outcomes?  Third, globalization  may be altering both what is possible
for  national  labor  policy  and  what  will  lead  to  the  best  outcomes.  Are  there  pressures  to
harmonize  labor  market  regulations  and,  if so,  in  what  direction?  How  can  the  regulatory
regime offer the optimal  social protection to workers without compromising national economic
competitiveness?  All of these questions  should be prominent  on the agenda for labor policy-
makers.
20Figure  1: Minimum Wage-to-Mean Wage Ratio, Selected Countries, Late 1990s
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21ANNEX
DETAILS OF NATIONAL  LABOR LEGISLATION ON SELECTED TOPICS22
The tables in this Annex provide  a sampling of labor legislation from various countries  on the
following topics:
*  scope of labor law application;
*  regulation of fixed term contracts,
*  private employment  services, job leasing/temporary  workers;
*  advance  notice,  justification,  and  severance  payment  requirements  for  individual  and
collective  dismissal;
*  rules  governing  establishment  of trade  unions,  restrictions  on  industrial  disputes  and
unfair labor practices;  and
*  provisions for minimum wages.
Information  is available for  17 countries selected on the basis of geographic representation  and
diversity of regulatory regimes.
22 This annex has been prepared by Makoto Ogawa
22Scope  of Regulations
Countries  Coverage of Regulations
Bangladesh  The Employment of Labor Law applies to every shop, commercial  or
industrial  establishment to which the Shops and Establishments Act of 1965
applies and every industrial establishment  in all other areas of Bangladesh  in
which five or more workers are employed or were employed on any day of
the preceding  twelve months.
Excludes Government owned and managed commercial or industrial
establishment,  employees of which are governed  by the Government  Servants
Conduct Rules.
Chile  Labor Code does not apply to "civil servants".
Independent workers are also excluded, except where Labor Code refers to
them specifically.
Ethiopia  Labor code does not apply to the following:
(a) health care workers;
(b) teachers;
(c) managers
(d) contracts of personal  service for non-profit making purposes;
(e) members  of the  armed  force,  members of the police  force,  employees
of state  administration,  judges  of courts  of law,  prosecutors  and  others
whose employment relationship is governed by special laws;
(f) sole proprietor businesses.
Ghana  Ghanaian  Labour  Laws  and  regulations provide apply to all enterprises
regardless of size and sector and all workers, permanent  or temporary.
Germany  Civil Code applies to all establishments.  Protection  against dismissal  applies
to an establishment regularly employing more than ten full time employees.
India  The labor code  applies to  every industrial establishment with one hundred or
more workers  are employed, or were employed on any day of the preceding
twelve months.
Iran  All employers  and workers, as well as workplaces and production,  industrial,
services and agricultural establishments  are required to comply with the
provisions of Labour Code.
Japan  Labor standards law applies to all workers except public servants and
seafarers.
Korea  (1)Labor Standards shall apply to all businesses or workplaces  in which more
than 5 workers are ordinarily employed, excluding those which employ only
relatives living together and workers hired for domestic  work only.
(2) Businesses or workplace which ordinarily employ less than 4 workers
may be subject to certain provisions of the Act as prescribed by the
Presidential Decree.  (Ch.7 Apprenticeship,  Ch. 9 Rules of Employment and
Ch.  10 Dormitory  are exempt for workplace less than 4 employees.)
Malaysia  The Minister may by order exempt or exclude, subject to such conditions as
he may deem fit to impose, any person or class of persons from all or any of
the provisions of this Act.
23Scope  of Regulations (cont'd)
Countries  Coverage of Regulations
Mexico  The Federal Labor Law shall be observed throughout the Republic of Mexico
and will govern the employment relations contemplated in Article  123 of the
Mexican  Constitution. (Title  6 of the Constitution establishes minimum
employment standards,  including working hours, minimum wages  and
compensation  for improper dismissal.)  Public employees are subject to
separate regulation.
Philippines  The Labor Code applies to all private sector employees,  including those in
agricultural.
Spain  Labor legislation applies to work done by Spanish  workcrs hired in Spain and
in Spanish undertakings in a foreign country.
Thailand  Labor Protection Act shall not apply to:
(1)  The central, provincial, and local government administrations.
(2)  State  enterprises  under  law  governing  state  enterprise  labour
relations.
Certain other work may be excluded by royal decree (e.g. agricultural work,
sea fishing work, transportation,  home work, etc.)
Tunisia  Labor Code is applied to all workers, except for public servant, domestic
workers  and seafarers.
United Kingdom  Protection from unfair dismissal applies only to the dismissal of an employee
who has been continuously employed for two or more years of services.
United States  Federal labor codes,  in general, apply to employers having a certain
minimum number of employees.  State and local legislations supplement
Federal laws.
24Regulation  on Fixed-term Contract
Countries
Bangladesh  'Permanent worker' means a worker who has been engaged on a
permanent basis or who has satisfactorily completed the period of his
probation in the shop or the commercial  or industrial establishment;
'Temporary worker' means a worker who has been engaged for work
which is essentially of temporary nature and is  likely to be finished
within a limited period;
The period of probation  for a clerical workers  is  six months; other
workers such period is three months in the shop or commercial  or
industrial establishment.
Chile  Fixed-term contracts may be made for a maximum duration of one year.
The continued performance of services after this period transforms the
contract into one of indeterminate duration.
Czech  Republic  The employment relationship  is considered  indefinite, unless for fixed
terrn as stated in the contract.
Fixed term employment  is not allowed for the following:
(a) graduates of  university-level  schools or specialist apprentice schools
hired for work that corresponds to their training;
(b) adolescents;
(c) employees  specified in the collective bargaining agreement;
(d) disabled persons or seriously disabled persons.
France  A fixed-term contract may be made only for the performance of a
specified and temporary job.  The total duration of this type of
contract may not exceed  18 months generally and may be renewed
only once and its maximum duration may not exceed 24 months.
Germany  Fixed term contracts are now widely possible without specifying any
objective reason.  Maximum number of successive contracts is 4. (no
legal limit in case of objective reason). Maximum  duration per contract
is 24 months (no legal limit in case of objective reason).
Ethiopia  A contract of employment may be concluded for a definite period or
for piece work in the case  of:
(1) the performance of specified piece work;
(2)  the  replacement  of a  worker  who  is  temporarily  absent  due  to
leave or sickness or other causes;
(3)  the  performance  of work  in  the  event  of abnormal  pressure  of
work;
(4)  the performance  of urgent work to prevent  damage or disaster to
life  or property,  to repair defects or breakdowns  in works,  materials,
building or plant of  the undertaking;
(5)  irregular  work which  relates  to a permanent  part of the works of
an employer but is performed at irregular intervals;
(6) seasonal work which relates to the permanent part of the works of
an  employment  but  is performed  only  for  a  specified  period  of the
year which is regularly repeated  in the course of a number of years;
(7) occasional  work which does not form part of the permanent activity
of the employer but which is done intermittently.
25Regulation  on Fixed-term Contract (cont'd)
Countries
Iran  The maximum duration of fixed term employment shall be determined
by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and approved by the
Council of Ministers.
Japan  Fixed term contract less than  I year is possible without restriction.
Fixed term contract less than 3 years is possible in the following cases:
(1) workers with professional knowledge,  skills and experience.
(2) workers older than 60 years.
Korea  The term of a labor contract shall not exceed one year, except in cases
where there is no term fixed or a term is fixed as necessary for the
completion of a certain project.
Malaysia  A contract of service for a specified period of time exceeding one month
or for the performance  of a specified piece of work where the time
reasonably required for the completion  of the work exceeds or may
exceed one month, shall be in writing.
Mexico  Fixed term contract may be made only in the following cases;
(1) nature of the work to be done so requires;
(2) to provide a temporary substitute for another employee;
(3)  in the other cases provide by the labor law.
In no case a worker be obliged to accept employment  for more than one
year.
Spain  Permitted inter alia, for specific tasks/projects;  temporary replacements;
training contracts; "eventualities of production"  and the hiring of
handicapped,  older workers and long-term unemployed.
Thailand  No restrictions.
United Kingdom  No restrictions
United  States  No restrictions.
26Regulation  on Private Employment  Service
Countries
Ethiopia  Any person who wishes to operate  a private employment  agency shall have
to obtain a license from the following authorities:
1)  Regional Authority responsible the implementation of labour laws, if
the employment  service is confined within that region;
2)  Ministry if the employment service is to be rendered  in two or more
regions;
3) Ministry if the employment service is to hire and send abroad an Ethiopian
worker to a third party.
Ghana  Current  labour  laws  in  Ghana  do  not permit  the  operations  of Private
Employment Services.
Japan  Private fee-charging  employment services were restricted to specified
occupations until recently.  Fee-charging employment service can now operate
with the permission of the Minister except for dock work, construction,
security guards and other works stipulated by the Order.
Korea  The Head of Municipal Government  must register domestic fee-charging
placement services
The Minister of Labor registers overseas  fee-charging placement service.
Minister of Labor also establishes the fees that placement services are
allowed to charge.
Mexico  Employment service for workers  shall be free, whether the service is
performed by a official or private institution.
27Regulation  on Dispatched Workers (job leasing/temporary work)
Countries
ILO Co.  18123  After consulting the most representative  organizations  of employers  and
workers concerned,  a government  may prohibit, under specific
circumstances, temporary works agencies from operating in respect of
certain categories of workers or branches of economic.
Czech Republic  No restriction
France  Limited to "objective"  situations, as with other fixed term
contracts.
Maximum duration of temporary work contract is 18 month.
Germany  Generally approved with the exception of construction  industry.
Japan  Temporary works are restricted to specific occupations.
Korea  Worker Dispatch System applies to jobs in direct production  in
manufacturing and the ones selected by the Presidential  Decree which
require expertise,  skills or experience.
Philippines  Temporary workers are regarded as directly employed.
Spain  Temporary work is legal as of 1994, but limited to "objective situations"
Turkey  Prohibited (with the exception of agriculture workers)
United Kingdom  No restriction.
United States  No restriction.
23 Private Employment Agencies  Convention,  1997
28Advance Notice Requirement for Dismissals
Countries
ILO Co.  158  A worker whose employment is to be terminated is entitled to a
reasonable period of notice or compensation  in lieu thereof, unless he is
guilty of serious misconduct.
Employers shall give written notice to competent authority when
contemplating terminations for reasons of an economic, technological,
structural  or similar nature.  Statement should include the reasons for
the termination,  the number and categories of workers likely to be
affected, and the time period over which the terminations are to occur.
Bangladesh  The worker must be given one month's notice in writing indicating the
reasons for retrenchment,  or paid in lieu of such notice.
Chile  *  30 days for dismissal without cause (domestic  staff, managerial
workers)  or for economic  reasons.
*  Written notice ofjustified dismissal including reasons,  facts,
and status of social  security contribution shall be delivered to the
worker and  copied to the labor inspectorate.  The letter must be sent
within three days following  the removal of worker.
Czech Republic  *  Notice period to employees should be three months when
employer has closed down, relocated, or transferred,  and in cases of
redundancy;
*  two months for other reasons.
Ethiopia  *  one month in the case of a worker who has completed  his probation
and has a period of service not exceeding one year;
*  two months in the case of a worker who has a period of service of
more than one year;
*  one month if terminated due to reduction  of workforce.
France  *  Employer must hold pre-dismissal hearing with employee.
The decision to carry out the dismissal must be transmitted by
registered letter and the employer must specify the reasons for
dismissal.
*  The notice period is:
One month,  if the employer worked between 6 months and
two years,
Two month, after two years service
Ghana  *  Daily wage employment is  deemed  to  be  a  contract  at  will and
may  be  determined  at  the  close  of day without  notice.
*  Where  the  agreement  is  to  pay remuneration  at  a  monthly
rate,  either party  may terminate agreement by  giving at  least 14
days  notice  or pay  in  lieu  of notice.
Germany  Notice varies with length of service:
2 weeks  in trial period, 4 weeks < 2 years,  1 month < 5 years, 2
months<  8 years, 3 months < 10 years, 4 months < 12 years, 5 months <
15 years,6 months < 20 years, 7 months > 20 years
Iran  Employers should issue written warnings for employees negligence
before dismissal.
29Advance  Notice Requirement for Dismissals  (cont'd)
Countries_X
Japan  *  30 days notice to employees is generally required.
*  In cases of employee misconduct,  employer can terminate contract
without notice with the authorization of Labor Standards Office.
*  For mass lay-offs (>30), employers should notify Public
Employment Security Office 30 days in advance.
Korea  An employer shall give 30 days an advance notice to a worker before
dismissal, including dismissal  for managerial reasons, or wages in
lieu of notice.
Malaysia  The length of notice shall be the same for both employer and
employee and shall be determined  by contract provisions.  In the
absence  of such provision in writing, notice shall not be less than:
(a)  four weeks' notice for < 2 years employed;
(b) six weeks' notice for between  2 and 5 years employed;
(c) eight weeks' notice if > 5 years employed
Either party to a contract of service may terminate such contract of
service without notice or with less notice by paying the other party the
sum equal to wages which would have accrued to the employee  during
the term of such notice or during the unexpired term of such notice.
Mexico  Written notice indicating the date of termination and reasons is
required.
Philippines  One month notice to employees  and Department of Labor and
Employment required when the employer terminates employment
contract due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment  to prevent losses of the closing or cessation of operation
of the establishment.
Spain  Prior consultation on alternatives to redundancy selection standards and
ways to mitigate the effects is required 30 days in advance (15 days in
firms with less than 50 employees).  Written agreement must be
reached, otherwise approval by labor market authorities  is required.
Thailand  In case of usual termination of employment,  advance notice in writing
to the other party at or before the time for any wage payment.
United Kingdom  *  not  less  than  one  week's  notice  if  his  period  of continuous
employment is less than two years,
*  not less than one week's notice for each year of continuous
employment if between 2 and 12 years of service
*  not less than twelve weeks' notice if his period of continuous
employment is twelve years or more.




ILO Co. 158  A worker whose employment has been terminated  shall be entitled to
(a) a severance  allowance
(b) benefits from unemployment  benefit
(c) a combination of such allowance and benefit
The amount shall be based inter alia on length of service and the level of
wages.
Bangladesh  30 days wages plus  14 days wages  for each year of service.
Chile  *  Dismissals for economic reason require 30 days wages for each
years of service, with a maximum of 330 days wages.
*  If a dismissal is unfair, the above compensation is increased  by 20%.
Czech Republic  2 months salary for dismissal in case of closed down, relocation, transfer
of employer, and redundancy.
Ethiopia  *  Thirty  (30)  days for the  first year  of service;  (proportional
sum for < 1 year);
*  For workers  serving more than one year, payment shall be
increased by one-third (1/3) of the above sum for every
additional year of service, not to exceed  12 month's wages;
*  If terminated due to closure of company or reduction of workforce,
the worker shall be paid, in addition to payments described above, a
sum equal to sixty days wage.
France  20 hours of pay for wage earners or 10 % of monthly wage for
salaried staff, multiplied by the years of service up to a maximum
of ten. For each year of service beyond ten, one-fifteenth of a
month's pay is added.
Ghana  Severance  pay is to be negotiated by employer (or representative)  and
employee  (or representative).
Germany  No legal entitlement, but can be included  in collective agreements and
social compensation plan
Iran  Where the termination of an employment contract is a result of the total
disability or retirement of the worker concerned, the employer shall pay
the worker an amount equivalent to 30 days' wages, at his most recent
rate of pay, for each year of completed service. This amount shall be in
addition to the worker's disability or retirement pension paid by the
Social  Security Organization.
Japan  No legal entitlement.  According to an enterprise  survey (>30 workers),
89% enterprises have voluntary retirement allowance plan.
31Severance  payment (cont'd)
Countries
Kcirea  *  An employer shall establish a retirement allowance  system
whereby an average wage of more than 30 days shall be paid for
each year of consecutive years employed  as a retirement
allowance to a retired worker;
*  In establishing the retirement allowance system,  a differential
retirement  allowance system shall not be permitted within one
business.
*  An employer  may, at the request of workers, pay retirement
allowances in advance for the period of continuous employment
of the worker concerned by adjusting the balances of
remunerations  before retirement. In this case, the number of
years of continuous employment for the computation of
retirement  allowances shall be counted anew from the moment
the latest adjustment of balances has been made.
*  Employer may establish a system whereby workers receive  lump
sum payment at the time of retirement, providing the amount is
not smaller that that of retirement allowances  in the other
system.





Mexico  If the employer has rescinded the work relationship without good cause,
the worker is entitled to compensation  according to the following
scheme:
*  If < I year of service, additional payment of half the salary received
for services rendered;
*  If employed > 1 year, the worker is entitled to six month's salary for
the first year of service and 20 days of salary of each subsequent
year of services rendered.
*  In addition, the worker will be entitled to three months' salary and
to back pay from the date of the dismissal up to the date that the
employer pays compensation.
Philippines  *  In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving  devices
or redundancy,  1 month salary per year of service ( legal minimum
= I month salary)
*  In case of retrenchment to prevent  losses and in case of closures  or
cessation of operation, I/2 month salary for each year of service
(legal minimum = I month)
Portugal  I month per year of service (legal minimum 3 months)
Spain  20 days' wages for each year of service up to a maximum of 12 months.
32Severance  Payment (cont'd)
Countries
Thailand  30 days salary for < 1 year of service;
90 days for between  I and 3years
180 days for between 3 and 6 years
240 days for between 6 yr and 1  Oyears
300 for over  10 years
Employers need not pay severance pay to an employee whose
employment is terminated for misconduct.
Tunisia  One day's salary for each month of effective service  in the same firm,
not to exceed three months'  salary.
Turkey  After one year's of employment,  one month for each year of service,
often extended by collective agreement to 45 days.
United Kingdom  For redundancy dismissal  only:
Age 22 and below: half a week's pay for each year of employment
Age 22-40: one week's pay for each year of employment
40 and above:  one and half weeks'  pay for each year of employment
United States  No legal regulations (but can be included in collective agreement or
company policy manuals).
33Conditions under which Dismissals are Fair
Countries
ILO Co.  158  Valid reason connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker
Valid reason based on the operational  requirements of the undertaking
establishment or service
Bangladesh  (a)  willful  insubordination  or  disobedience,  whether  alone  or  in
combination with others, to any lawful or reasonable order of a superior;
(b) theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection  with the employer's business or
property;
(c) taking or giving bribes or any illegal gratification  in connection with his
or any other worker's employment under the employer;
(d) habitual absence  without  leave or absence  without leave  for more than
ten days;
(e) habitual late attendance;
(f) habitual breach of any law or rule or regulation applicable to the shop or
commercial or industrial establishment;
(g) riotous or disorderly behaviour  in the shop or commercial  or industrial
establishment, or any act subversive of discipline;
(h) habitual  negligence or neglect of work;
(i)  frequent  repetition  of any  act  or  omission  for  which  a  fine  may  be
imposed;
(j)  resorting  to  illegal  strike  or  'go-slow'  or  inciting  others  to  resort  to
illegal strike or 'go-slow';
(k)  falsifying,  tampering  with,  damaging  or  causing  loss  of  employer's
official records.
Chile  Dismissal without cause is possible  for domestic staffs,  persons representing
the employer.
The employer may dismiss a worker for misconduct or on the ground of
failure to meet the requirements of the undertaking.  The contract may be
terminated without compensation.
The ternination also be made by the economic reasons, (modernization
activities reduced productivity,  changes in Market, etc.).
34Conditions under which Dismissals are Fair (cont'd)
Countries
Czech Republic  The employer may serve notice  upon his employee only for the following
reasons:
(a) if the employer, or his organizational component (branch), shuts down or
relocates;
(b) if the employer ceases to exist, or if his organizational  component is
transferred to another employer and it is not possible for that employer to
employ the employee in accordance  with his employment contract;
(c) if the employee becomes redundant as a result of the decision of the
employer to change the enterprise's goals or its technical equipment, to reduce
the number of employees for the purpose of increasing work efficiency, or to
make other organizational changes;
(d) if the state of the employee's  health is such that he has suffered a long-
term loss of ability to perform the work;
(e) if the employee does not  meet the requirements  for the proper
performance of work, (employer must have documented poor performance
within the previous  12 months and called upon the employee in writing to
eliminate the deficiencies,  and the employee failed to eliminate them within a
reasonable period of time);
(f) the employer might immediately  cancel the employment relationship due
to serious breaches of work discipline; for ongoing but less serious breaches
of work discipline,  the employee may be served notice if, during the previous
six months in connection  with his breach of work discipline, he was notified
in writing of the possibility of being given notice of termination.
35Conditions under which dismissals  are fair (cont'd)
Countries
Ethiopia  a contract of employment  shall be terminated without notice only on the
following grounds:
(a) repeated and unjustified tardiness despite warning to that effect;
(b) absence from work without good cause  for a period of five consecutive
working  days  or  ten  working  days  in  any  period  of one  month  or  30
working days in a year;
(c) deceitful  or fraudulent  conduct  in carrying out his duties having regard
to the gravity of the case;
(d) misappropriation  of the property or fund of the employer with intent to
procure for himself or a third person undue enrichment;
(e)  returning  output  which,  despite  the  potential  of  the  worker,  is
persistently  below the  qualities  and quantities  stipulated  in the collective
agreement or determined by the agreement of the two parties;
(f) responsibility for brawls or quarrels at the work place  having regard to
the gravity of the case;
(g) conviction for an offence where such conviction  renders him unsuitable
for the post which he holds;
(h)  responsibility  for  causing  damage  intentionally  or  through  gross
negligence  to any property  of the employer or to another property  which  is
directly connected with the work of the employer;
(i)  commission  of any  of the  unlawful  activities  referred  to  in  section
14(2);
(j)  absence  from  work  due  to  a  sentence  passed  against  him  of
imprisonment for more than 30 days;
(k) commission of other offences stipulated in a collective agreement as
grounds for terminating  a contract of employment without notice.
The following grounds relating to the organizational or operational
requirements of the undertaking shall constitute good cause for the
termination of a contract of employment with notice:
(a) any event which entails  direct and permanent  cessation of the worker's
activities  in part or in whole resulting in the necessity of a reduction of the
workforce;
(b) without prejudice to the provisions  of subsection  (6)  of section  18,  fall
in  demand  for the  products  or services  of the  employer  resulting  in  the
reduction  of the volume of the work and profit and thereby resulting  in the
necessity of the reduction of the workforce;
(c)  a decision  to alter work  methods or  introduce new  technology  with  a
view to raise productivity resulting in the reduction of the workforce.
France  All dismissal should be based on well founded and valid grounds.  The
termination by an employer should be justified by a genuine and
serious reason.
Ghana  Conditions forjustified  dismissals  must  be  contained  in a  Collective
Agreement  concluded  by  a Trade Union  and  an  employer  through  a
Standing Negotiating Committee.
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Countries
Germany  Dismissals must be based on factors  inherent  in the personal characteristics  or
behavior of the employee (such as insufficient skill or capability) or business
needs and compelling operational reasons
Iran  Where a worker is negligent  in discharging his duties or if, after written
warnings, the worker continues to violate the disciplinary rules of the
workplace, the employer shall, provided that the Islamic Labour Council  is in
agreement,  be entitled to pay to the worker a sum equal to his last monthly
wage for each year of service as a length of service allowance, in addition to
any deferred entitlements,  and to terminate his employment contract.
Japan  There is no legal regulation on justifiable reasons for dismissal.  But
according to the cases by the court, dismissals are justifiable for "reasonable
cause".
Redundancy dismissal requires:
(1) rational business reasons for restructuring,
(2) unavoidable redundancy in the company as a whole.
(3) reasonableness of  selection criteria,
Korea  (I)If an employer wants to dismiss a worker  for managerial  reasons, there
shall be urgent managerial needs.
(2)In  the case  of paragraph  (1),  an  employer  shall  make  every  effort to
avoid  dismissal  of workers  and  shall  select  workers  to  be  dismissed  by
establishing rational and fair standards of dismissal.
(3) An  employer shall  have sincere consultation regarding  measures to avoid
such  dismissal  and  standards  of dismissal  stipulated  in  the  provision  of
paragraph (2)  with a trade union of a business or workplace,  in cases where a
trade union is  formed by the consent of the majority of all workers, or with  a
person  who represents  the majority of all workers  (hereinafter referred  to as
workers'  representative),  in cases where  there exists no trade union which  is
composed of majority of all workers.
(4) In cases where an employer has dismissed workers in accordance with the
requirements as stipulated  in paragraph (1) to (3), it shall be deemed that the
dismissal concerned is made based on the justifiable reasons in accordance
with paragraph (1)  of Article 30.
Malaysia  *  Either party to a contract of service may at any time give to the other
party notice of his intention to terminate such contract.
*  Where  a worker considers that he has been dismissed without just cause
or excuse by his employer, he may make representations  in writing to the
Director General to be reinstated  in his former employment.
*  An employee shall be deemed to have broken his contract of service with
the employer if he has been continuously absent from work for more than
two consecutive working days without prior leave,  unless he has a
reasonable excuse.
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Countries
Mexico  *  Employee misconduct
*  Falsification of qualification  (30 days only)
*  Insubordination
*  Drunkenness
*  Immoral acts at workplace
*  Threatening the safety of other co-workers
*  Breaching confidentiality of trade secretes
*  Excessive absenteeism (more than 3 days in a 30 days) without good
cause.
Morocco  *  Criminal/legal conviction
*  Divulging professional  secret causing commercial loss to enterprise
*  Committing any of the following  in the enterprise or on the job:
*  Theft, abuse of confidence,  drugs, intoxication,  injuring or threatening
employer or management
*  Refusal to do assigned work without legitimate reason
*  Absence without reason for 4 full days or 8 half days in a  12 month
period
*  Causing harm to machinery/equipment voluntarily or because of lack of
attention
*  Committing a mistake leading to significant material loss to employer
*  Not following instructions to maintain safety in enterprise,  leading to
significant material  loss to employer
*  Bad moral conduct
Philippines  An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following cases;
*  Serious misconduct or willful disobedience  by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or representative  in connective with his work
*  Gross and habitual neglect by the employees of his duties
*  Fraud or willful breach by the employee of  the trust reposed in him by j  is
employer or duly authorized representative.
*  Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of
his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly
authorized representative
*  Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Portugal  *  Dismissals are allowed based on disciplinary, economic reasons, and lack
of professional or technical capacity.
*  Dismissals for individual redundancy must based on urgent need and
must not involve posts also manned by people on fixed-term contracts.
*  Dismissals for lack of competence  are only possible after introduction of
new technology or change to job structure.
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Spain  The employment contract may be terminated because of the following valid
reasons.
*  The ineptitude of the worker which is known or later demonstrated  after
his or her actual placement in the enterprise.
*  The worker's failure to adapt to the technical modification  of his or her
job, if such changes are reasonable  and have occurred  after a minimum of
two months from the introduction of the modification.
*  Absence form work, even justified but intermittent, which amounts to
20% of the working days  in two consecutive amounts, or 25% in four
discontinuous months within a period of 12 months.
The following are considered non-performance  of contractual obligations.
*  Repeated and unjustified absence or lateness  in the workplace.
*  Indiscipline or disobedience  at work
*  Verbal  or physical offences against the employer or persons employed in
the enterprise or the family living with them.
*  Violation of contractual  goodwill, and abuse of confidence in the
discharge of duties
*  Habitual drunkenness or drug addiction if it adversely affects the
worker's work
Thailand  *  When an employment agreement does not have a date specified for its
termination, the boss or the employee may terminate the employment
agreement by giving advance notice  in writing.
*  When  a employer wishes to terminate the employment of an employee
because of the managerial  reasons (restructuring etc.), the employer shall
inform the Labour Inspection Officer and the employees whose
employment is to be terminated  of  the date of termination  of employment,
the reasons for termination of employment and the names of the
employees not less than sixty days before the date of termination of
employment.
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Tunisia  The termination of employment  is unlawful unless there is a "real and
serious" reasons.  Serious misconduct include:
*  Willful damage to the property of the undertaking
*  Willful reduction of the product volume or product quality
*  Non-observance  of rules related to safety and health
*  Neglect of the duty to take necessary measures to assure personal security
or to safeguard  confidentiality
*  Disobedience  of legitimate orders
*  Bribe-taking
*  Theft
*  Turning up for work in a state of intoxication
*  Consumption of alcohol at the workplace
*  Absence or desertion of the workplace without good cause or the
employer's permission
*  Violence or threats against colleagues or other persons during working
hours
*  Divulging trade secrets
*  Refusal to led assistance in case of imminent danger to the firms or
persons at the workplace
Turkey  none
United Kingdom  An employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer.
A reason falls within fair dismissal if it:
(a)  relates  to  the  capability  or  qualifications  of  the  employee  for
performing  work of the  kind which  he was employed by the employer to
do;
(b) relates to the conduct of the employee;
(c) is that the employee was redundant;  or
(d) is that the employee could not continue to work in the position which he
held without contravention (either on his part or on that of his employer) of a
duty or restriction imposed by or under an enactment.
The  determination of  the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair
(having regard to the reason shown by the employer):
(a)  depends  on  whether  in  the  circumstances  (including  the  size  and
administrative resources of the employer's undertaking) the employer acted
reasonably  or  unreasonably  in  treating  it  as  a  sufficient  reason  for
dismissing the employee,  and
(b) shall be determined  in accordance with equity and the substantial  merits of
the case.
United States  With the exception of the public sector, it is generally fair to terminate an
open-ended employment relationship without justification  or explanation
(employment-at-will  principle) unless the parties have placed  specific
restrictions on termination.
40Compensations  and Remedies for Unjustified Dismissal
Countries  Compensations for Unjustified Dismissal
ILO Co.  158  Employee can appeal to a court, labour tribunal, arbitration committee
or arbitrator and these bodies can order reinstatement  or payment of
adequate  compensation.
Bangladesh  (a) the worker concerned  shall  submit his grievance to his employer,  in
writing,  by registered  post within  fifteen days of the occurrence  of the
cause  of such  grievance  and  the employer  shall  within  fifteen  days of
receipt  of  such  grievance,  enquire  into  the  matter,  give  the  worker
concerned  an opportunity  of being heard  and communicate  his decision,
in writing, to the said worker;
(b) if the employer fails to give a decision under clause (a) or if the
worker is dissatisfied with such decision, he may make a complaint to
the Labour Court having jurisdiction, within, thirty days from the last
date under clause (a) or within thirty days from the date of the
decision, as the case may be, unless the grievance has already been
raised as a labour dispute under the provisions of the Industrial
Relations Ordinance.
Chile  A worker who feels his or her dismissal  is unjustified  or improper
may bring a claim before the Labor Court.
Ethiopia  Labor dispute settlement tribunal may order the reinstatement of the
workers or payment of compensation if reinstatement  is difficult.
The compensation to be paid shall, in addition to the severance pay,
(a)  180 days pay, plus remuneration for the appropriate notice period
for workers with contracts of employment  for an indefinite period; or
(b) for fixed term workers,  full wages which the worker would have
obtained if the contract of  employment has lasted up to its date of
expiry or completion of piece work.
France  *  If the employer fails to observe the notice period, the employee is
entitled to compensation  in lieu of notice.
*  Where an employee is dismissed without correct procedure but with
just cause, the court will order compensation of less than one
month's wage.
*  If the dismissal  is unfair, the court may propose reinstatement.  If
either of the parties rejects such a proposal, the court will award
compensation not less than the remuneration  that the employee
received during the six months immediately preceding his
dismissal.
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Iran  Where a Disputes Board finds that the dismissal of the worker is
without just grounds,  it shall issue an order for his reinstatement and
for the payment of his remuneration  as of the date of his dismissal.
Altematively,  where dismissal is found to be justified, the worker
shall be entitled to his length of service allowance in the amount
prescribed  in section 27 of this Code.
Note. Where the worker does not wish to resume his employment, the
employer shall pay him 45 days' wages and salary for every year of
service completed.
Korea  (1)If a worker  is dismissed,  laid off, suspended, transferred,  or subject to
other punitive  actions or has his salary reduced  by an employer without
justifiable  reason,  the worker  may request  a remedy  for it to the Labor
Relations  Commission.
(2)In relation to the procedures of the application for remedy and
investigation,  the provisions of Articles  82 to 86 of the Trade Union and
Labor Relations Adjustment Act shall be applied.
Malaysia  Where a workman  considers that he has been dismissed without just
cause or excuse by his employer, he may make representations  in
writing to the Director General to be reinstated in his former
employment.
Mexico  The worker may appeal to the Conciliation and Arbitration Board
(CAB). If the CAB finds there was no good cause for the dismissal, the
worker shall be entitled to provide back pay up to the date of  the award,
and to reinstate the employee.
Morocco  Employee  can bring complaints to a tribunal which can order
reinstatement or compensation that cannot be greater than 24 months of
some regulatory minimum salary.  The level of compensation should
take into consideration the age, seniority,  nature of work and all other
relevant conditions.
Philippines  An employee shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to his full back wages, inclusive of
allowances  and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent.
Portugal  Employee can chose between reinstatement  with back pay counting
from the date of the dismissal to the actual court sentence;  or
compensation  of one month of pay per years of service (with a minimum
indemnity of 3 months)
Spain  Employer can choose between reinstatement with back pay and since
1999, compensation of 33 days per year of service, with a maximum of
24 months pay.  Workers hired under pre-1997  legislation can still
receive up to 45 days severance pay per year of service, with a total of
42 months.  In certain cases involving discrimination or union/works
council activities, the dismissal is "annulled" and employers have to
accept reinstatement.
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Thailand  The employer shall pay the employee a special compensation payment
in lieu of notice in an amount equal to sixty working days'  wages.
Tunisia  The compensation for unjustified dismissal varies from one or two
month's salary for each year of service, up to maximum of three years
salary.
Turkey  Court are not empowered to order reinstatement, with the exception  of
dismissals on grounds of trade union activities.  Standard remedy is a
right to compensation amounting to triple the notice period, plus regular
severance pay.
United Kingdom  Industrial Tribunal may order reinstatement or re-engagement.
The Industrial Tribunal has wide latitude regarding whether to order
reinstatement or to award compensation.
The award consist of
(a)  a basic award - same as severance payment
(b)  compensatory  award - any expenses reasonably incurred by the
complainant in consequence of the dismissal
(c)  Special award - one week's pay multiplied by 156 or £ 20,600
which  is higher but not exceed £27,500.
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Countries
ILO Co.  158  When the employer contemplates termninations for reasons of an
economic, technological,  structural or similar nature, he shall notify, in
accordance with national law and practice, the competent  authority
thereof as early as possible, giving relevant information,  including a
written statement  o the reasons for the termination,  the number and
categories of workers likely to be affected  and the period over which the
terminations are intended to be carried out.
Ethiopia  In the case of reduction  in workforce  (more than  10% reduction  of
workers or reduction of more than 5 workers  in case of 20-50
establishment),  workers having skills and a higher rate of productivity
shall have priority of being retained in ti. -ir posts and, in  the case of
equal skill and rate of productivity, the workers to be affected first by
the reduction  shall be in the following order:
(a)  subject  to  the  provisions  of (b)  - (c)  of this  subsection,  those
having the shortest length of service in the undertaking;
(b) those who have fewer dependants;
(c) those not covered under subsection  3(a) and (b) of this section;




France  An employer should consult with the work committee or staff
delegates and inform competent authority of the proposed
dismissals.  After the consultation,  the employer defines the criteria
for setting the order of dismissals.  These criteria must take into
account family responsibilities,  length of service, etc. The
notification period is:
At least 30 days if the number of dismissals is less than 100;
45 days if the number of dismissal is 100-250;
60 days if the number of dismissals is 250.
Korea  Large changes of employment, according to criteria as set forth by the
Presidential Decree, due to automation, construction or expansion of
production facility or contraction and adjustment of business  scale, must
be reported to the employment  security agency.
Morocco  Authorization  by the employment  authority and three month notice is
required for mass layoff.
In the case of mass dismissal for economic reasons, additional
documents are required
*  A report explaining economic reasons
*  Economic/financial  state of  the enterprise
*  A report prepared by a financial controller/accountants
Spain  Prior consultation on alternatives to redundancy selection standards and
ways to mitigate the effects is required 30 days in advance (15 days in
firms with less than 50 employees).  Written agreement must be reached,
otherwise  approval by labor market authorities is required.
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Countries
Portugal  75 days if agreement  on dismissal procedure can be reached, otherwise
90days. Consultation on alternative to redundancy selection standards
and ways to mitigate the effects must take place - a written agreement to
be reached if necessary via conciliation  by labour inspector.
Turkey  Advance notice required from 2 weeks to 8 weeks,  depending on the
length of service.  (e.g. 2 weeks for less than six months, and 8 weeks for
more than 3 years.)
Tunisia  One month notice is required, if compensation  is paid in lieu of notice,
the amount paid must at least be equal to the length of notice period.
Employers must seek conciliation  from labor inspector prior to mass
layoffs for economic or technological reasons.  If conciliation is
unsuccessful, the matter is heard by the tripartite Commission for  the
Control of Dismissal.
Philippines  When the employer terminates employment contract due to the
installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy,  retrenchment to
prevent losses of the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment,  he has to submit notice to the Department of Labor and
Employment and to workers at least one month before the intended date.
45Conditions/Requirements of Establishment of Trade Unions,  and Federation of Trade Unions
Countries
Ethiopia  (1)  One trade union may be established  in an undertaking  where the
number of workers is 20 or more.
(2)  Workers  who work in undertakings which have less than twenty workers
may form a general trade union, provided, however, that the number of the
members of the union is not be less than  20.
Bangladesh  *  Workers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish
and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to join
associations of their own choosing without previous authorization;
*  A trade union of workers  shall not be entitled to registration  under this
Ordinance unless it has a minimum membership of thirty per cent of the
total number of workers employed in the establishment or group of
establishments  in which it is formed.
Ghana  *  The  formation  of trade  unions requires  that  they  shall  be
registered.
*  Any  five  or  more  workers  can lawfully  form  a trade  union.
*  Part  I  of the  Industrial  Relations Act,  1958  (Act  56)  established
the  Ghana  Trades  Union  Congress  to  act  as  the  nerve  center  of the
various  trade  unions  in  Ghana.
Japan  The following must be included  in an article of trade unions:
*  Anti -discrimination  article
Provisions for secret ballot for election of officers and for industrial
dispute
Korea  Workers are free to establish a trade union or to join it, except for the case of
public servants  or teachers who are subject to other enactments.
Malaysia  *  The Director General may refuse to register a trade union in respect of
a particular establishment  if he is satisfied that there is in existence a trade
union representing  the workmen in that particular establishment  trade,
occupation  or industry and it is not in the interest of the workmen
concerned that there be another trade union in respect thereof.
*  A certificate of registration of a trade union may be cancelled  or
withdrawn by the Director General - where two or more registered  trade
unions exist in a particular establishment,  as the case may be, the Director
General may, if he is satisfied that it is in the interest of the workmen in
that establishment.
46Countries  Conciliation of Labor Disputes
Bangladesh  Industrial disputes will be conciliated by Conciliator and if necessary,
arbitrated by an Arbitrator.  Cases can be appealed to the tripartite Labour
Court, and then to the Labour Appellate Tribunal (tripartite) whose decision
shall be final.
Ethiopia  The following labor disputes are examined at labour divisions in regional first
instance court, regional appellate court, and Central High Court.  The
decision of Central High Court shall be final.
(a) disciplinary measures including dismissal;
(b)  claims  related  to  the  termination  or  cancellation  of  employment
contracts;
(c) questions related to hours of work, remuneration,  leave and rest day;
(d) questions related to the issuance of certificate  of employment;
(e) claims related to employment injury;
(f)  unless  otherwise  provided  for  in this  Proclamation,  any  criminal  and
petty offences under this Proclamation.
The following  labor disputes are examined by conciliator, and Labor
Relations Board (tripartite).  All findings of facts made by the Board shall be
final and aggrieved party can appeal to Central High Court solely on
questions of law.
(a) wages and other benefits;
(b) establishment of new conditions of work;
(c)  the  conclusion,  amendment,  duration  and  invalidation  of collective
agreements;
(d)  the  interpretation  of any  provisions  of this  Proclamation,  collective
agreements or work rules;
(e) procedure of employment and promotion of workers;
(f)  matters  affecting  the  workers  in  general  and  the  existence  of  the
undertaking;
(g) claims related to measures taken by the employer regarding  promotion,
transfer and training;
(h) claims relating to the reduction of workers.
Ghana  The  method  of settlement  of labour  disputes  range  from  grievance
resolution procedure,  through  negotiation  to  arbitration.  Joint  Negotiating
Committees  are  established under  the  Act  for  compulsory  negotiations. If
the settlement  of disputes  involving  certified  trade union  and  the
employer  fail,  either  party may  report  this  failure to  the  Minister,  with
the  request  that  a Conciliation  Officer  may  be  appointed.
Iran  In the event of a dispute between an employer and a worker or a trainee
concerning the application of this Code or other labour regulations, or in
relation to a training contract,  a workplace agreement or a collective
agreement,  a settlement shall, in the first instance, be sought by direct
compromise between the employer and worker or trainee or his representative
on the Islamic Labour Council. If such a council does not exist in the
workplace,  a compromise  shall be sought by the employer and the workers'
guild society or the legal representatives of workers and the employer.  Where
no compromise can be reached, the dispute shall be examined and settled by
the Board of Inquiry or the Disputes Board.
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Japan  Dispute will be deliberated  first in a local labor committee (tripartite) then in
a Central Labor Committee (tripartite).  If the party concerned  is not satisfied
with the Committee's decision, they can file suit with  ;vil court.
Korea  The Labor Relations Commission shall conduct the p  :eedings of mediation
when one of the parties to labor relations submits a request for mediation and
arbitration to the tripartite Labor Relations Commission.  If the party
considers the arbitration by a Regional Commission violates the law, that
party may apply for review to the National Commission and then file an
administrative  suit. Submitting an application for review does not suspend the
effect of an arbitration award or a decision made by the Labor Relations
Commission.
Malaysia  Industrial disputes are reported to the Director General of Industrial Relations
and then referred to the Industrial Court (tripartite).
Any party can appeal to the High Court a question of Law. A decision of the
High Court is the final.
Mexico  Disputes between employers and employees  are subject to the decisions of a
Conciliation  and Arbitration  Board. The Board shall be composed  of an equal
number of representatives of workers and employers, with one government
representative.  If an employer refuses to submit the dispute to arbitration or
to accept the decision of the CAB, the labor contract shall  be considered
terminated and the employer will be required to indemnify the worker in the
amount of three months' wages.
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Ethiopia  Workers and employers  in the following essential  service are exempt from
the application of strike  and lockout articles of labor code.
(a) air-transport and railway services;
(b) undertakings supplying electric power;
(c)  undertakings  supplying  water  and  carrying  out  city  cleaning  and
sanitation  services;
(d) urban and inter-urban  bus services and filling stations;
(e) hospitals, clinics, dispensaries and pharmacies;
(f) banks;
(g) fire brigade services; and
(h) postal and telecommunications  services;
Bangladesh  *  If a strike or lock-out lasts for more than 30 days, the Government
may, by order in writing, prohibit the strike or lock-out:
*  If it is satisfied that the continuance of such strike or lock-out is
causing serious hardship to the community or is prejudicial to the national
interest, the Government may, by order in writing prohibit a strike or
lock-out at any time before the expiry of thirty days.
*  In the case of any of the public utility services, the Government  may,
by order in writing, prohibit a strike or lock-out at any time before or after
the commencement of the strike or lock-out.
Ghana  No restriction.
Japan  Public servants are prohibited from striking.
Korea  Industrial action shall not be taken without completing adjustment
procedures.
Workers in certain  industries such as electricity, water or a business which
produces mainly defense goods shall not be allowed to take industrial action.
(The scope of those workers who are engaged in a business which produces
mainly defense goods shall be deternined by the Presidential  Decree.)
Malaysia  No workman in any essential service shall go on strike -
(a) without giving to the employer notice of strike,  within forty-two days
before striking;
(b) within twenty-one  days of giving such notice; or
(c)  before  the  expiry  of the  date  of strike  specified  in  any  such notice
aforesaid.
No workman shall go on strike and no employer of any such workman
shall declare a lock-out -
(a) during the time pending the proceedings  of a Board of Inquiry  appointed
by the  Minister under  Part VIII  involving such workman  and employer  and
seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings;
(b)  after  a  trade  dispute  or  matter  involving  such  workman  and  such
employer  has  been referred  to the  Court  and the  parties  concerned  have
been notified of such reference;
(c) after a relevant  State Authority has withheld consent to the reference  of
the dispute  to the  Court under  section  26 (2),  and the  parties  concerned
have been notified thereof,
(d) in respect of any of the matters covered by a collective  agreement taken
cognizance of by the Court in accordance  with section  16 or by an award;
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Bangladesh  An employer may not:
(a) impose any  condition  in a contract of employment  seeking to restrain the
right  of a person  who  is  a  party  to  such  contract  to join  a trade  union  or
continue his membership of a trade union; or
(b)  refuse  to  employ  or  refuse  to  continue  to  employ  any  person  on  the
ground that such person  is, or is not, a member or officer of a trade union;
(c) discriminate  against any person  in regard to any employment,  promotion,
condition  of  employment  or  working  condition  on  the  ground  that  such
person is or is not, a member or officer of a trade union; or
(d)  dismiss,  discharge,  remove  from  employment  or  threaten  to  dismiss,
discharge  or remove  from  employment  a workman  or  injure  or threaten  to
injure him  in  respect of his employment  by reason that the workman-  is or
proposes  to  become,  or seeks  to  persuade  any  other  person  to become,  a
member  or  officer  of a  trade  union,  or  (ii)  participates  in  the  promotion,
formation or activities of a trade union;
(e) induce  any person  to refrain  from becoming,  or to cease  to be a member
or officer of a trade  union, by conferring  or offering to confer any advantage
on,  or by procuring or offering to procure  any advafitage  for such person  or
any other person;
(f)  compel  any  officer  of  the  collective  bargaining  agent  to  sign  a
memorandum  by  using  intimidation,  coercion,  pressure,  threat,  confinement
to  a  place,  physical  injury,  disconnection  of water,  power  and  telephone
facilities and such other methods;
(g) interfere with or in any way influence the balloting provided for in section
22; or
(h)  recruit any new workman during the period  of strike under  section 28 or
during  the  currency  of  a  strike  which  is  not  illegal  except  where  the
Conciliator  has, being  satisfied  that complete  cessation  of work  is likely  to
cause  serious  damage  to the  machinery  or installation,  permitted temporary
employment  of a  limited  number  of workmen  in  the  section  where  the
damage is likely to occur.
Japan  Employers are prohibited from the following unfair labor practices:
*  Discrimination against union members
*  Refusal to engage in collective negotiation without just cause.
*  Intervention in unions activities, including financial  support to unions.
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Korea  The following are illegal labor practices:
(I)dismissal  of or discrimination  against a worker on the  grounds that the
worker  has joined or  intended  to join  or  establish  a trade  union,  or has
performed a justifiable act for the operation of a trade union;
(2)employment  of a worker  on  the condition  that the worker  should  not
join  or  should  withdraw  from  a trade  union,  or  should join  a particular
trade union.  However,  in cases where  a trade union  is representing  more
than two-thirds of workers employed  in the same business,  a conclusion of
a collective agreement under which a person is employed on condition that
he/she  becomes  a  member  of the  trade  union  shall  be  allowed  as  an
exceptional  case.  In  this  case,  the  employer  shall  not  discriminate  the
worker for reasons that he expelled from the trade union;
(3)refusal or delay of conclusion of a collective agreement or of collective
bargaining,  without justifiable  reasons,  with  the representative  of a trade
union or a person who has been authorized  by a trade union;
(4)domination of or interference with the formation or operation of a trade
union by workers and wage payment for full-time  officials of a trade union or
financial  support for the operation of a trade union. However, the employers
may allow the workers to take part in consultation or bargaining with the
employers during working hours, and may provide subsidies for the welfare
of the workers, or for the prevention and relief of financial difficulties,  and
other disasters, and may provide union office in minimum size; or
(5)dismissal  of or discrimination  against a worker on the grounds that the
worker has taken part in justifiable collective activities, or has reported the
violation  of the provisions  of this  Article  by the employer to  the Labor
Relations  Commission,  or  has  testified  about  such  violations  or  has
presented evidences to administrative  authorities.
Malaysia  Employers may not:
(a) impose any condition  in a contract of employment seeking to restrain the
right of a person  who  is a party to the contract to join a trade union,  or to
continue his membership in a trade union;
(b)  refuse  to  employ  any  person  on  the  ground  that  he  is  or  is  not  a
member or an officer of a trade union;
(c)  discriminate  against  any person  in regard to employment,  promotion,
any condition  of employment  or working conditions  on the ground that he
is or is not a member or officer of a trade union;
(d)  dismiss  or threaten  to  dismiss  a workman,  injure  or threaten  to
injure him in his employment or alter or threaten to alter his position to
his prejudice by reason that the workman  is or proposes to become, or
seeks to persuade any other person to become,  a member or officer of a
trade  union;  or  participates  in the  promotion,  formation  or activities  of a
trade union;  or
(e) induce a person to refrain from becoming or to cease to be a member or
officer of a trade union by conferring or offering to confer any advantage on
or by procuring or offering to procure  any advantage  for any person.
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Iran  The Supreme  Labour Council shall be responsible  every year for fixing
minimum wages for the various regions of the country according to the
sectors of industry, with regard to the following criteria:
(1)  The  rate  of  inflation  announced  by  the  Central  Bank  of the  Islamic
Republic of Iran;
(2) The minimum wage shall be sufficient to meet the living expenses of a
family,  regardless of the physical and intellectual abilities of workers and the
characteristics of the work assigned.
Ghana  The Tripartite  Committee  on  Wages  and  Salaries Guidelines  meets
periodically  to  determine  a daily  national  minimum  wage  for  Ghana.
A  national  minimum  wage  is the  least  daily  wage  below  which  no
employer is  permitted  to  pay  an  employee  and  is enforceable  by  law.
Japan  Minimum wages are determined  by the tripartite Minimum Wage Counsel,
based on living expenses,  market wages,  and paying capacity of employers.
Korea  The tripartite Minimum Wage Council determines minimum wages according
to the category of business and taking into consideration the cost of living of
workers, the wages of kindred workers,  and labor productivity.
Mexico  The tripartite National Board of Minimum Wages establishes minimum
wages.  [Although the minimum wage shall be sufficient to meet the normal
requirement of a head of a family, the current minimum wage is no longer a
valid point of reference.  No employer pays minimum wage; workers  cannot
survive on such a small amount.]
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Countries  Coverage
Japan  Government pays a part of unpaid wages to workers in a bankrupted
company.  Wage/salary have priority to the other general obligations but
inferior to tax liability.
Korea  The Minister of Labor shall, on behalf of the employer,  pay the deferred
wages and retirement  allowances for the worker in case of employers
bankruptcy,  etc., (as determined  by the Presidential  Decree).
Malaysia  The court shall not authorize payment of the proceeds of the sale to the
secured creditor until the court shall have ascertained  and caused to be paid
the wages of such employee, or the money due to any sub-contractor for
labour under a Contract.
Mexico  Wage/salary shall have priority over all other obligations of the employer in
the event of bankruptcy.
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Summary  Findings
Labor  market regulation  involves many aspects,  ranging from  how
employers contract for the services of workers to the nature  of the
exchange,  including terms  of conditions of employment. This area of
regulation represents  an important and often controversial aspect of
public policy in both developed  and developing countries. Approaches
are dominated by opposing views, one which favors the protection of
workers through labor legislation and collective bargaining and the other
which  emphasizes the  advantages of encouraging  market processes.  In
the end,  however,  what  matters  are the economic and social  outcomes
of different approaches. This  primer paper reviews different  regulatory
options regarding hiring and firing and wage determination  and summarizes
the existing knowledge about their labor market  effects. It also reviews
two  important  institutional aspects  of labor  market regulation -
enforcement and dispute  resolution.  In an annex to the paper,  we
summarize the  statutory arrangements for various topics  related to labor
market regulation in 1  7 countries.
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